

EUROPEAN FORUM FOR URBAN SAFETY

# *Secucities* Crime Prevention Europe

*A comparative study of crime prevention policies  
in seven European cities*

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*'Neither the European Commission, nor any person acting in its name is responsible for the use which might be made of the following information.'*

*It is essential to exchange experiences because we cannot build Europe without communication. For us, as elected officials, it is necessary to compare implemented strategies because we have the duty to always further improve the life of the inhabitants in our cities.*

Josep Brugada, Deputy mayor of Girona, Spain  
Participant in the Secucities Crime Prevention Europe programme

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## Introduction

### 1. Context and project objectives

Implementation of the National Councils on Crime, beginning in 1971 in Denmark, or equivalent, specialised structures such as the *Permanent Secretariat for Prevention Policy* in Belgium in 1992 or, more recently, the *Deutsches Forum für Kriminalprävention* in 2001 in Germany, the launching of national crime prevention programmes in a majority of European States, and the development of partnership at the local level all represent varied responses that have been implemented since the 1970s to combat insecurity.

It is also a matter of responses to an increasingly strong social demand in face of a situation that can be attributed, in large part, to the crisis of regulatory systems linked to the welfare state<sup>1</sup> and signs of the preoccupation of public authorities. To this must be added the attitude of elected officials, quite often the first ones having to confront the demands of their constituents and who have become aware of the structuring effect of the questions of security on the occasion of elections and who find themselves seeking models for action or, more simply, concrete arrangements.

A recent report submitted to the European Council<sup>2</sup> thus mentioned: *'Insecurity has become one of the major preoccupations of urbanised societies. In face of the increase in minor and major crime [...], one expects rapid actions and concrete solutions from politicians in charge'*, adding: *'this situation, in which most European countries find themselves, means that security has become a primordial stake in political elections; the training in presence is forced to react before the worry of their fellow citizens'*. This clearly brings out that, while notions and concepts may differ from one country to another, the fight against crime has indeed become a priority, be it on the local, national or European level.

In addition to the cross-disciplinary nature of all the policies that have been stimulated, the interest being accorded to the local level by national and European policies constitutes a strong point of the initiatives being carried out. The pertinence of the local level in dealing with crime appears as of the early 1990s in the work of European and even international institutions. Here, we might mention, in a non-exhaustive manner, several of these projects, which are representative of this movement.

Thus, the European Urban Charter (European Council, 1992), which, in its sixth theme (urban safety and crime prevention), emphasised the necessity of setting up, at the local level, joint instances of dealing with crime. Similarly, the Salish Report 'Report on Petty Crime in Urban Agglomerations and its Links with Organised Crime' (European Parliament, 1993) insisted on the necessity of dealing with crime locally. The Petrozavodsk Conference (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, 1999) also acknowledged the contribution of local

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<sup>1</sup> P.Hebberecht and D.Duprez, 'Sur les polices de prévention et de sécurité en Europe: réflexions introductives sur un tournant', in *Déviance et Société*, vol. 25, 2001.

<sup>2</sup> *Sécurité et prévention de la criminalité dans les villes: création d'un observatoire européen*, project report, J-M Bockel (Reporteur), Commission of the Environment and Agriculture, Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council, April 2001.

authorities in cross-border co-operation on the themes of prevention, crime and urban safety. Finally, the Nairobi International Forum on Urban Poverty (U.N., 1999) integrated the necessity of crime prevention in the running of cities, in order to promote social integration.

Aside from the recognition of the local level in the handling of crime, all the initiatives mentioned below have, in common, the idea of enhancing an interdisciplinary approach, an articulation of safety and accompaniment policies, the establishment of partnerships between the prevention players as well as the development of approaches favouring proximity with the citizens. These priorities make the security of individuals and property a factor in the development of our societies<sup>3</sup>.

In addition to the aforementioned work, Article 29 of the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) marks an important step in the area of crime prevention by mentioning it amongst the policies of the European Union working towards a space of freedom, security and justice.

The European Council of Tampere (15-16 October 1999), as well as the Praia da Falesia Conference (4-5 May 2000) subsequently underscored the importance of this objective in their conclusions. The former requested the integration of aspects linked to prevention into actions of fighting crime and the development of national crime prevention programmes, whereas the second identified the guiding lines for future actions regarding prevention at the European Union level.

In 2001, the support of the European Commission, at the initiative<sup>4</sup> of the French presidency of the European Union and of Sweden for the setting up of the *European Crime Prevention Network* again marked the involvement of the European level in this type of policy, just as it was able to do for the sector of organised crime. This network groups institutional representatives (from the ministries of Justice and, if they exist, the Interior), researchers as well as representative associations of each of the Union's member countries. The launching, the same year, of the *Hippocrates* budgetary line by the Justice and Home Affairs directorate of the European Commission aimed at supporting initiatives in the specific area of crime prevention, constitutes another strongpoint in the orientations that have been taken. Moreover, it is this line of financing that supports the *Secucities Crime Prevention Europe* project.

Since its creation in 1987, the European Forum for Urban Safety, a non-governmental organisation bringing together nearly three hundred European towns, has focussed its activities on exchanges between European players working in the safety field. The *Safety and Democracy Manifesto*<sup>5</sup> constituted an important step in the recognition of the pertinence of dealing with crime locally for the cities of this network, which enacted principles of joint action regarding crime prevention.

Previous work carried out by the European Forum for Urban Safety and supported by the European Union allowed for further studying the methods used at the local level for fighting crime, especially with the setting up of permanent co-operation organisations<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Thus it was that the United Nations, on the occasion of the 10<sup>th</sup> Congress for Crime Prevention and Dealing with Delinquents (Vienna, 10-17 April 2000), stressed the importance of carrying out an effort in view of 'integrating a crime prevention section in national and international development strategies'.

<sup>4</sup> Official Journal of European Communities, 16 December 2000, reference number C 362/15.

<sup>5</sup> *Manifesto of the 'Safety & Democracy' cities*, European Forum for Urban Security, Naples, December 2000.

<sup>6</sup> In particular: Michel Marcus and Catherine Vourc'h, *Outils pour l'action*, European Forum for Urban Security, December 1996, and Jean-Paul Buffat, *Les politiques partenariales et contractuelles favorisent-elles une*

These had given prominence to the diversity of local and national contexts on the level of insecurity as well as the tools at the disposition of States and cities. However, despite these specificities, and while excluding a developmentalist approach that would imply that the least advanced experiences tend towards a single ideal type similar to the Anglo-Saxon model, an important place given to partnership in the methods used at the local level for preventing crime is observed and this, regardless of whether it is a matter of 'top down' policies (initiated at the national level) or 'bottom up' (created at the local level).

There is no alternative but to observe that, despite the origins of a policy, the complexity of the local scene obliges its players to both go beyond established frameworks (which are proposed or imposed on them) or, if need be, to invent them. In truth, they use the tools placed at their disposal as much as local specificities. In this sense, all the policies carried out in cities are innovative and the expression of the ability of a territory and its players to act. Instancing all the differences that have been mentioned does not prevent, either in theory or in practice, comparing and exchanging local experiences because these concern individuals (perpetrators, victims or citizens) and jurisdictions, which are often similar. Crime prevention policies must be analysed as so many means or obstacles, not for permitting the attaining of an ideal type of public policy but for preserving this common object of individuals and property.

It is therefore not surprising that a considerable amount of work carried out in Europe concerning crime prevention comes to the conclusion of the necessity of developing exchanges of know-how and experiences. This theme of exchange has become recurrent at all levels, and the annual *European Crime Prevention Prize*, which rewards local projects, is a good example of this.

This report presents the issues and local practices at work in the area of crime prevention in seven European cities. It is also a matter of placing them within a European perspective, by comparing them with each other while also studying them from the viewpoint of the development of policies initiated by the institutions of the European Union.

In greater detail, the *Secucities Crime Prevention Europe* project has the following objectives:

- 1 – Bringing out *the conceptual frameworks* that, at the national and local levels, preside over the implementation of crime prevention policies and comparing different approaches;
- 2 – Studying, more precisely, the way in which territorial jurisdictions in Europe conceive a prevention policy and *drawing up an overall chart of methodology, content and orientation of these policies*;
- 3 - Pinpointing *what the cities under study share in common, and what comes out as a specific on the level of major trends in violence and urban incivility as at the level of prevention methods* (particularly as regards the participation of inhabitants, which is constituent in the contribution of cities in determining prevention policies).
- 4- Creating *a joint conceptual framework of local prevention policies* at the heart of the seven cities.



## 2. Methodology

### The choice of sites

Seven cities<sup>7</sup>—Bonn (Germany), Brent (United Kingdom), Girona (Spain), Liège (Belgium), Luton (United Kingdom), Modena (Italy) and Marseilles (France)—are studied in this report.

The choice of these sites is not a matter of chance. First of all, it was determined by the necessity of comparing policies set up in several member States of the Union in order to ensure a sufficiently broad European dimension for the study. It involves both States from the North (Belgium, France, United Kingdom), where local prevention policies lie within clearly identifiable national strategies set up as of the 1980s and which concern partnership in particular, and States of the South (Spain and Italy), which leave more room to local innovation. Finally, the German example is ‘hybrid’ in that, owing to the State’s federal structure, the local organisation of crime prevention still varies strongly according to the *Länder* studied. None of the cities can constitute a representative model of the practices carried out at the local level in its country, even though it reflects them in part.

Then it was the involvement of cities in developing crime prevention strategies, which determined their involvement in the project. In particular, there is the fact that Brent has participated for a number of years in European projects, that Liège held the presidency of the *Belgian Forum for Prevention and Urban Safety* and Girona that of the *Spanish Forum for Urban Safety*, that Modena was the first Italian city where a security protocol was set up, that prevention in the city of Marseilles is based largely of the abundance of its associations, that Luton’s arrangement accords a large share to the prevention of juvenile delinquency, and that Bonn has a noticeably higher crime rate than that of the *Land* of Nordrhein-Westfalen<sup>8</sup>.

The cities studied are not of equal demographic size. Whilst the demographic average is somewhere in the neighbourhood of 170,000 habitants, Girona, the smallest, and Marseilles, the largest metropolis, stand out clearly from the other cities.

Bonn	Brent	Girona	Liège	Luton	Marseilles	Modena
310,000	252,000	75,000	186,000	183,100	807,000	176,000

*Table 1: The number of inhabitants per city*

From a socio-economic point of view, Brent, Liège and Luton stand out with more disadvantaged profiles. Modena distinguishes itself by the size of the foreign populations it takes in, and certain districts in the process of rehabilitation, whereas Bonn and Girona would have to be considered rather privileged. Finally, Marseilles stands out by its size and the variety of contexts that can be encountered there.

**Liège** is located in a former industrial basin based on the steel industry and mining, which suffered from a major crisis and, as a result, has found itself indebted for the past several decades. Due to its geographical location and the business it concentrates (leisure, shops), its drawing power and the recorded population flows are considerable. The number of

<sup>7</sup> Owing to municipal elections, the city of Lisbon (Portugal) was unable to follow the project.

<sup>8</sup> In 2001, the crime rate of the city of Bonn stood at 111.35% while, for the *Land* of Nordrhein-Westfalen, it was only 76.42. The data relative to crime in each are studied in greater detail in the first part of the study.

unemployed benefiting from welfare remains high, while that of the ‘non-working of the second generation’<sup>9</sup> seems, according to the city’s social services, to be increasing.

The characteristics of the housing situation as well as the freeze in granting social aid to asylum seekers, which was late in comparison with other Belgian towns, also explain in part the presence on the territory of several thousand newly regularised or clandestine asylum seekers, including asylum seekers registered on the territory of other towns.

**Brent** and **Luton** are closely akin to each other to the extent that both are affected by difficult socio-economic conditions in several of their districts.

Thus, in 2000, the city of **Brent** (a district of London, where Wembley Stadium is located) was classed as the 78<sup>th</sup> most disadvantaged city, and three of its districts are ranked amongst the 100 hardest hit in England and Wales. It suffers from one of the highest death rates in the country for those aged 24 and under. The share of ethnic minorities within the overall population reaches 53%<sup>10</sup>, and is made up primarily of natives of India, the Caribbean and Pakistan.

As for **Luton**, the share of representatives of ethnic minorities is lower (19.2%) but, in certain neighbourhoods, is as high as 60%. Depending on the sectors of the city, the unemployment rate ranges from 3 to 12%. It is estimated that 9% of the housing is inappropriate to a suitable life of the inhabitants.

**Modena** also claims several districts in difficulty. The sector of the railway station, formerly an industrial neighbourhood in which working-class populations were grouped, is henceforth where populations in difficulty (notably the clandestine immigrants) are centred. In addition, the city boasts a relatively large foreign population (10,000 persons).

Although **Bonn** and **Girona** are of quite different demographic size, they are characterised by more favourable socio-economic conditions. This is explained in part by the fact that Bonn was the capital of the former Federal Republic of Germany and, owing to that, benefited from numerous infrastructures (especially in terms of transportation) and a high living standard. Girona remains a fairly rich historical city, even though one of its quarters concentrates underprivileged populations.

Finally, **Marseilles** is made up of small village cores scattered over the whole communal jurisdiction. For the past hundred years or so, these quarters created Committees of Neighbourhood Interest, run by volunteer workers. The rate of social housing is very distinctly above the national average.

All the inhabitants’ identification with their city is quite strong, one finds a large Muslim community (150,000 or more) and more than 80,000 natives of the Comoros.

The unemployment rate has been dropping for the past six years but its average is still 17% and reaches 50% in certain districts. Finally, Marseilles, like Liège, attracts asylum-seekers.

It appeared that these profiles determine, in part, the insecurity that these cities must face up to. Evidently, Bonn and Girona might be considered as cities less effected by insecurity, as opposed to Liège (one of the cities in French-speaking Belgium hardest hit by crime) or Marseilles, more particularly victim of organised crime (smuggling of human beings and merchandise in the harbour area, etc.).

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<sup>9</sup> Here, it is a matter of young people who have always seen their parents unemployed and who do not have jobs themselves.

<sup>10</sup> In 1991, this rate rose to 5.5% at the national level.

There remains the fact that one finds, to varying degrees in all the cities studied, common problems that refer back to identical publics (juvenile delinquency, drug-related crime, the vulnerability of elderly people, etc.) or to the same places (city centres, shopping areas, etc.). Despite the limits inherent in the diversity of profiles studied, this allows for bringing out a common body both on the level of problems as well as on the general organisation of crime prevention, and even studying the reaction of different cities to the same problem.


### The approach followed

Two work seminars were organised (Girona, 15-16 February 2002, and Paris, 28-29 June 2002), bringing together representatives, elected officials and technicians<sup>11</sup> from these cities, as well as a researcher<sup>12</sup>.

Personalities from the *Crime Concern* organisation (United Kingdom), the *Finnish National Council on Crime Prevention*, the *Bavarian Crime Prevention Commission* (Germany), and the Emilia Romagna Region (Italy) joined the group, their task being to present their work and contribute their thinking on local crime prevention projects that had been presented.

In addition to the mission's methodological guidelines, these seminars were the occasion for each one to present the general organisation of crime prevention in the city under consideration and specific projects (notably concerning the revitalisation of a neighbourhood, arrangements for mediation and the prevention of juvenile delinquency).

Visits *in situ* made to each of these cities were the occasion for carrying out individual or collective interviews<sup>13</sup>, primarily with the aim of studying the joint dynamics at work. As the following graph shows, while the prevention project leaders (58%) and representatives of associations (20%) made up the majority of the persons heard, meetings with elected officials (9%) and citizens or persons at risk also contributed to the conclusions of this report.



*Graph 1: The categories of persons heard in the course of the project*

<sup>11</sup> By 'technician', we mean the person in charge of the crime prevention set-up in the city. However, for the presentation of concrete projects, individuals in charge of particular plans also participated in the seminars.

<sup>12</sup> Mr Claude Jacquier, researcher at the National Centre of Scientific Research (CNRS, France).

<sup>13</sup> It concerns in particular the steering committee of the prevention department of the City of Liège and the Stakeholders meeting in Luton.

The major objectives of these city visits were to:

- Evaluate as far as possible the 'field reality' of each city and discover its specificities
  - ⇒ How does the player perceive crime and its evolution? What are the characteristics of the publics concerned by the measures set up (victims as well as perpetrators)?
- See how crime prevention is being organised
  - ⇒ What is the organisation of services at the level of objectives pursued as well as the means brought into play?
- Encounter the vision of the players in the field
  - ⇒ How is work organised with the other partners? What are the plan's strengths and weaknesses?

### The project methodology

3 Opinions		
The working party	The vision of the decision-makers and local players	An analysis of data relative to urban safety and to national and European contexts
↓	↓	↓
3 Bases of analysis		
Two work seminars bringing together the representatives of the seven cities, a researcher and European experts	About 80 decision-makers and local players who were met in the project's partner cities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Analysis of the urban safety situation in each of the cities studied</li> <li>- Study of national contexts (policies initiated regarding urban safety)</li> <li>- Analysis of European policies</li> </ul>
3 Objectives		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The setting-up of the overall project methodology</li> <li>- General presentation of the crime-prevention plans (1<sup>st</sup> seminar) and specific projects (2<sup>nd</sup> seminar) implemented in each of the project cities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Listing insecurity problems encountered in the framework of the service concerned</li> <li>- Assessing the joint dynamic in the city studied</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Placing local policies studied within their national context</li> <li>- Putting into perspective the policies studied with the orientations set at the European level</li> </ul>

## 4. Plan of the report

While the development of crime prevention policies in Europe is undeniable, the object of this report is to present the common points and differences between experiences conducted at the local level. Beyond the differences linked to contexts both national and local, it was a matter of discovering whether one can show a common context for the projects studied.

The first part of this report draws up an account of crime in the Member States and cities studied and presents the responses contributed by the States and the European Union, examining in detail the crime prevention policies that they are developing.

The second part is devoted to the study of crime prevention in the seven cities studied. It is a matter of presenting both the approach followed for setting up action plans, the organisation of means within cities for managing and following the prevention policy, and the priorities of action that are defined.

Finally, in conclusion, we will present recommendations relative to the setting up, follow-through and evaluation of local crime prevention policies as well as the role of States and the European Union on the subject.

# 1. Crime prevention: a common approach in Europe?

## 1.1 Insecurity in Europe and the cities studied

### 1.1.1. Crime recorded in the Member States

	Crime rate (in ‰)	
	Local	National
<b>Bonn</b>	111.35	77
<b>Brent</b>	129.1	103.3
<b>Luton</b>	118	
<b>Liège</b>	229	81.12 <sup>14</sup>
<b>Girona</b>	n.a.	23
<b>Marseilles</b>	122.3	68.8
<b>Modena</b>	58.36	38

*Table 2: Crime rates for the year 2001  
(Source: EFUS)*

The comparison of national crime rates brings out a larger number of incidents reported for the same number of inhabitants in the most northern States of Europe (United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany and, to a lesser degree, France). Those of the South (Spain and Italy) stand out with crime rates below 40‰, which does not necessarily mean less important crime in those States. Indeed, on the one hand, the administrative statistics do not cover all the same infractions and thus do not take into account the same share of reality<sup>15</sup>. On the other hand, the report of occurrences in the official counts also depends on the activity of the police force and the attitude of citizens in reporting to the relevant services events of which they have been victims.

In general, certain categories of charges are better reported. This is especially the case with damage to property for which the insurance companies require a declaration to official authorities so that victim may be reimbursed (for example, auto theft), whereas others remain poorly informed. We can identify three main factors<sup>16</sup>, which explain why incidents may not be reported by a victim: 1) the victim does not consider the incident sufficiently serious, or it involves only a negligible loss; 2) he or she reckons that the police will be unable to do anything, or that the incident lies within the private sphere (this is especially true of familial violence).

Despite the limits of the comparison of crime in the various European States, it is pertinent to study the general evolutions. A British study<sup>17</sup> thus points to an increase of crime of 1% in the

<sup>14</sup> For the year 2000.

<sup>15</sup> This also implies that a modification of the statistic tool can bring with it an increase in volume of the number of reported incidents. This situation has been encountered especially in the United Kingdom with a modification, in 2002, of police statistics, which henceforth include emergency calls (which are systematically reported).

<sup>16</sup> *British Crime Survey*, Home Office, 2000.

<sup>17</sup> Gordon Barclay and Cynthia Tavares, *International Comparisons of Criminal Justice Statistics 2000*, Research Development & Statistics Directorate (Home Office), July 2002.

Member States of the European Union over the 1996–2000 period, with increases in Belgium (17%), Austria (15%), Portugal (13%), the Netherlands (9%), France (6%) and Greece (6%) and decreases in Ireland (27%), England and Wales (8%), and in Germany (6%). Over the same period, there was an average increase in violent crimes of 14% in the Member States, whereas home burglaries decreased by 15%, and auto thefts by 2%.

The limits of administrative statistics in accounting for the reality of crime have led the majority of Member States to set up increasingly complete tools for explaining their statistics. Such is the case, for example, of the Report on security in Germany (*Erster Sicherheitsbericht 2001*)<sup>18</sup>, or for getting information on occurrences that are less well known, which is the case with the investigations on victimation carried out particularly in the Anglo-Saxon countries (*British Crime Survey*), an approach followed by several cities.

### 1.1.2. Common trends in all the cities studied

Analysis of the administrative statistics of the seven cities in the project, supplemented with information gathered in the course of visits to sites, allowed for bringing out common trends as to the nature of crime that cities must confront:

- *Acquisitive crime represents the largest share in overall criminality*

Theft of all kinds (in homes, vehicles, shops, etc.) represents at least half the crime recorded in all the cities (54.9% in Bonn, 60.3% in Liège and up to 67% in Modena). The most significant share of this category consists of thefts linked to vehicles<sup>19</sup> (28% of all the thefts in Luton), after which come burglaries of homes and businesses.

The cities concentrate business parks (shops, leisure activities) and offer more criminal opportunities, particularly in city centres. So it is in Marseilles, in the Canebière district, in the city centre of Liège and round rail stations, notably in Bonn, where the underground passage that provides access to the platform (the '*Bonner Lauch*') facilitates gatherings of marginalised individuals.

Finally, the areas that have the highest housing densities are obviously those where the highest number of burglaries are committed. However, the burglary rate can vary considerably according to the characteristics of the dwellings and their location in the city. On this topic, Budd (1999)<sup>20</sup> identifies several factors that increase the risks of burglary, notably: the absence of systems for making inhabitants feel more reassured, low occupation rates, the fact of living in an isolated settlement or in the city centre, when the occupant is a single-parent family.

It should be noted, not only for burglaries but also for other types of crime, that the perpetrators do not systematically come from the city under consideration. Thus, in Liège, the majority of perpetrators are non-residents (60% of all identified perpetrators); the sites studied

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<sup>18</sup> *Erster Periodischer Sicherheitsbericht*, Bundesministerium des Innern, Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2001.

<sup>19</sup> Thefts of vehicles and from inside vehicles

<sup>20</sup> Quoted by the security audit of the city of Luton: Budd, T. (1999), *Burglary of Domestic Dwellings: Findings from the British Crime Survey*, Home Office Statistical Bulletin 4/99, London, Home Office.

are, for the most part, large urban centres where population flows are considerable and increase crime of exogenous origin, i.e., for which perpetrators are not city residents.

- ***Street crime constitutes a significant share of crime***

Street crime constitutes a significant share of crime. Thus, even when this form of crime represents only 10% to 30% of overall crime, it is that which risks leaving the greatest impression on citizens, because it can be the most visible. The crime audit of the city of Brent thus mentions that, even though the level of street crime is not particularly high compared with other cities of the London suburbs (a rate of 9.4‰), this type of crime is a major priority for the inhabitants and services of the municipality.

This street crime groups together notably ‘classic thefts’, such as auto theft, as well as thefts such as pickpocketing (up 26% in Bonn in 2001 compared with the previous year) and, more particularly, thefts of cell phones that are sometimes accompanied by violence (62.2% more thefts with violence in Marseilles in 2001 compared with the previous year). This latter type of crime is closely linked to the development and democratisation of the new technologies, which have become standard consumer goods. Such modifications of the consumption market influence crime at the level of its structure as well as its importance. Several studies underscore that this type of crime tends to diminish once the market becomes saturated, for that brings with it a sufficient drop in prices to no longer justify thefts motivated by a profit upon reselling it<sup>21</sup>.

- ***Crime levels are linked to socio-economic conditions of the places studied***

Just as the nature of crime is not the same in all sectors of a city—for example in Marseilles, where one observes a predominance of burglaries in the South, acts of violence and thefts in the centre, and trafficking of all manner in the North, so is it concerning the weight of criminality. This can register powerful variations according to the district, as is the case in Luton, where the Saints sector has a crime rate of 55.8‰, whereas this rate rises to 184‰ for the South sector.

Whilst the concentration of business in the same area can favour the development of certain forms of crime, socio-economic factors also play an important role in the nature of crime and in its distribution within cities. The crime audit of the city of Luton thus established that 87.9% of the variations in crime levels were linked to the socio-economic context. Thus, in Brent, the Saint Raphael, Willesden and Harlesden sectors are suffering from weak socio-economic conditions and high crime rates, whereas those of Barnhill, Sudbury Court and Kenton, to the contrary, are enjoying good socio-economic conditions and less crime. Furthermore, it is observed that the least-favoured places often attract more problem populations, especially drug addicts, who can provoke an increase in crime.

Even when the links between socio-economic conditions and the crime level are clearly established, all cities have neighbourhoods that are literally stigmatised by the population and sometimes even by the inhabitants of those neighbourhoods themselves and considered ‘blackspots’. So it is in a district of Girona that groups only some thirty Gypsy families, the La Cayolle district in Marseilles or the Bressoux-bas-Droixhe district of Liège, made up for

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<sup>21</sup> M. Felson and R. V. Clarke, *Opportunity Makes the Thief*, Police Research Series, Paper 98, Research Development Statistics, 1998.



the most part of social housing and where 70% of the population does not work, and which was, according to the admission of the city services, ‘in the media’s sights’.

The stigmatisation of certain places in a territory can make the work of crime prevention players particularly difficult and, as is stressed by the audit of the city of Brent, the improvement in the economic and social conditions of a quarter can only be achieved by the realisation of work aimed at diminishing the feeling of insecurity on the part of the inhabitants.

- ***Involvement of young people in criminality constitutes an important preoccupation for citizens and public authorities***

Country	Percentage of minors in the total number of identified perpetrators
<b>Germany</b>	20
<b>Belgium</b>	n.a.
<b>Spain</b>	5.4 <sup>22</sup>
<b>France</b>	21
<b>Italy</b>	n.a.
<b>United Kingdom</b>	8.9 <sup>23</sup>

*Table 3: The percentage of minors in crime recorded in 2001  
(source: EFUS)*

While the percentage of minors in the total number of perpetrators of crimes is relatively low, its increase worries a majority of Member States, which largely take this into account in the reform of their legislation, notably by questioning themselves on the recourse to criminal law, on revising the legal majority of minors, or else on the toughening of punishment for recidivist minors<sup>24</sup>.

This preoccupation with the involvement of minors in criminality is reflected in the cities studied: the persons questioned pointed out both a recent increase in young people banding together in gangs, which often remain very loosely structured<sup>25</sup>; the fact that these populations are getting younger (around 12-13 years of age); and a recent feminisation of these populations, even though we observe that young male perpetrators of crimes are still very largely over-represented in juvenile delinquency<sup>26</sup>. We notice that young people are most involved in theft and street crime. Thus, in Bonn, the under-21 segment represents nearly 52% of the total of perpetrators of thefts and 49.2% of the perpetrators of street crime, and so it is in Marseilles, where minors, who represent 25% of all identified perpetrators of crimes, account for 40% in street crime. Overall, we observe that it is the older ones who are the most involved in crime, notably in Luton, where the 15-19 year-olds represent only 6.8% of the population, but 23.4% of the total of perpetrators of crimes.

<sup>22</sup> Percentage of 0–16 years of age.

<sup>23</sup> Percentage of 10–17 years of age.

<sup>24</sup> On this subject: Michel Marcus, in the ‘Juvenile Justice in Europe’ Seminar, 19 & 20 October 2000, Paris (France).

<sup>25</sup> The notion of gang crime is not evident. Indeed, contrary to what might be observed in the United States, where there exist certain highly structured gangs that obey strict rules, reports gathered in the cities of the project give the impression of juvenile delinquency in gangs as being groups of minors assembled for the occasion, forming or disbanding according to the opportunities.

<sup>26</sup> The audit of the city of Luton thus brings out that, after 17 years, the ratio between male and female under-age delinquents is about 3 to 1.

However, youth involvement in crime remains particularly difficult to assess. On the one hand, while a majority of local players agree in observing an increase in this category of perpetrators of crimes, it remains quite difficult to establish what they mean by 'young'. This is a notion, which, as mentioned in the crime analysis of the Local Safety Contract of the commune of Marseilles, has no 'very precise age limit'. Indeed, most often it does not refer strictly to legal majority. On the other hand, this feeling of a hardening of juvenile delinquency owes a great deal to the perceptions of citizens and city services as regards groups of young people who, as a Luton policeman remarked, 'even if they aren't encouraging crime, they intimidate citizens simply by their numbers'. This stigmatisation of young people is found in a majority of cities where it is observed that, even for incidents of lesser importance, the ties between adults and young people remain difficult. As an assistant of the Juvenile Court of the city of Modena pointed out, adults who file a complaint with the police sometimes systematically transform what can occasionally be described as 'acts of thoughtlessness inherent to youth' into a crime.

Finally, it is also necessary to underscore, at the same time as young people's involvement in committing criminal acts, their over-representation as victims in certain types of crime. Indeed, while vehicle- or home-owners are essentially the most vulnerable to thefts, with elderly people also making up a particularly vulnerable category, it appears that a significant proportion of young people and, especially, young adults are victims of crimes. Thus, a victimisation survey carried out in Bonn in 1998 brought to the fore that, in the course of the year, 42% of 15-19-year-olds were victims several times, whereas this percentage is lower for older age groups. Other studies carried out in Brent and Luton corroborate that young victims are more particularly effected by violent crimes such as muggings. An enquiry carried out in Brent from a sampling of 900 students showed that 38% of them had been victims of physical attacks (and 78% of verbal abuse).

### ***1.1.3. Local specificities that are the expression of different local and national contexts***

Whilst all the cities studied are largely facing up to the problems and common preoccupations such as low-intensity criminality (which tends to occur increasingly on the public highway and in which youths and young adults are apparently increasingly involved, it must be admitted that notable differences remain. These differences reflect local specificities as much as national problems, reinforced by electoral controversies, which will also influence local priorities.

As such, it appears that the nature of crime in the large metropolises such as Marseilles and Liège is diverging more clearly from that of other cities. *Marseilles* seems to be experiencing a rise in urban violence that characterises other large French cities such as Strasbourg, but must face several forms of specific insecurity linked notably to its most insecure districts where there are sometimes large ethnic minorities<sup>27</sup>. It is first a matter of organised crime, primarily based on unofficial trafficking and drug dealing in the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods and around the harbour area. The *sub-cultures* of violence that favour them

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<sup>27</sup> However, owing to French tradition, which refuses any Anglo-Saxon kind of approach that takes minorities into account but, to the contrary, favours an egalitarianism that excludes any reference to belonging to an ethnic minority, it remains difficult to study the links between the jeopardizing of certain communities and its incidence in terms of security.

being especially those of exclusion and precariousness, they reach all individuals to various degrees of corruption, but very few families are really connected to the Mafia. According to the city services, drug addiction and its consequences would be linked to this criminality. More than any other partner city in the project, Marseilles must face up to the phenomenon of young people in a homeless situation<sup>28</sup>, gathering, in particular, at the Saint-Charles rail station. This category of public brings together young people who periodically run away from home and are, *a priori*, only slightly involved in crime, whereas others become more actively involved in criminality (theft, receiving stolen goods, etc.). The media coverage, largely relayed at the national level, has at least temporarily reoriented a portion of associations' work towards these publics.

**Liège**, which is hemmed in in the middle of 400-sq. km agglomeration of nearly 500,000 inhabitants, also exerts a strong drawing power, notably for fragilised populations including, as has already been mentioned, asylum-seekers as well as more marginalised publics. The proximity of the municipality to the Dutch city of Maastricht favours what local players call '*ant traffic*' (crossing the border to procure drugs needed for personal consumption or the resale of quantities necessary for financing personal consumption), with the consequence of increasing the number of people in a social exclusion situation. Indeed, those persons move into vacant housing (out of some 85,000 dwellings listed, 3,500 of them have been abandoned) and other squats that certain proprietors place at their disposal, which is also the case in Marseilles, where prostitutes especially rent lodgings by the week.

As for **Luton** and **Brent**, they are marked by an older climate of urban violence. This is especially illustrated in Brent by the settling of scores that result in assassinations in broad daylight by young adults from the African community<sup>29</sup>. In addition, the residential environment and the presence of alleyways behind the houses facilitates burglaries.

These cities also stand out owing to the phenomenon of alcohol abuse, which is particularly more developed than in the other countries. In 2000, 33% of those questioned within the framework of the British victimation survey<sup>30</sup> claimed to having been victim of violence inside or in the vicinity of pubs. However, while consumption of alcohol does not always result in violent crime but rather disturbances (noise at night, etc.), the scale of the phenomenon orients the debate to determining whether this problem should be tied in with that of drug addiction, notably by reinforcing the prevention actions geared towards the youngest publics. Indeed, we observe, particularly in Brent, that the excessive consumption of alcohol especially touches minors of 13-14 years, who gather in large groups and drink quantities of hard alcohol.

Whilst the cities of the southern States, **Modena** and **Girona**, as well as **Bonn** in Germany, have comparatively lower crime levels, they nonetheless have tolerance thresholds that are lower on the part of the population as regards criminality. The first two must face a more recent increase in foreign populations and also trafficking linked to prostitution and drugs (primarily in the case of Modena). In Bonn, where public awareness was heightened by the departure of nearly one third of its police forces following the loss of its status as capital of the Federal Republic of Germany, the specific problems are primarily focussed on the fight

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<sup>28</sup> According to the cities' services, it is primarily a matter of young adults (10% under 16), largely male (62% boys as opposed to 38% girls) and mostly of French origin even though the appearance of mafia networks have been singled out, these bringing with them illegal immigration for the needs of trafficking and prostitution.

<sup>29</sup> This situation has pushed the city, in partnership with the police and inhabitants of the neighbourhoods concerned, to launch a large-scale media 'shock' campaign entitled *Not Another Drop* [of blood].

<sup>30</sup> *British Crime Survey*, Home Office, 2000.

against right-wing extremism, which is always a priority in that country, as well as the fight against Islamic fundamentalism, a problem further strengthened following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.

## **1.2. National contexts that have progressively favoured the formation of partnerships at the local level**

In the implementation of a local crime prevention policy, the level and structure of crime are obviously not the sole factors orienting action priorities. All the cities studied in this report do not dispose of the same frameworks of action to the extent that European States, for the most part beginning in the 1980-90s, implemented new public safety policies which supervise them, more or less. Although taking stock of the notions (prevention, security, crime) is imperative, it is necessary to distinguish between crime prevention policies carried out in the United Kingdom, Belgium and France, from those of Germany, Spain and Italy, to the degree that the former are the most clearly identifiable and represent those that influence most clearly the local level in its action.

### ***1.2.1. The concept of crime prevention in the European States***

As Hebberecht and Sack<sup>31</sup> stressed, a comparative approach in the analysis of crime prevention concepts is necessary, given how much they may vary from one country to another. Thus, whereas it will be more a matter of criminal dissuasion in Germany, where the term ‘prevention’ has, as opposed to France, for example, long referred to police activities for preventing risks and dangers before covering the initiatives intended for publics and territories in difficulty. In the United Kingdom and Belgium, prevention means all the practices developed outside the criminal system aimed at reducing or even suppressing deviant behaviour. Even more, in the aforementioned countries, crime prevention is extended to social policies in France and Spain.

The production of a category—here, crime prevention—remains a social process that refers directly to different cultures and political realities. As such, it is not surprising that the term ‘crime prevention’, used by European institutions for the purpose of unification of discourses<sup>32</sup>, is not generally approved of by local and national players in Europe. However, concerning security, a consensus has been established to make it a condition of the protection and freedom of individuals, or even a fundamental right as defined in France by the *Law of Orientation and Programming on Security* of 21 January 1995<sup>33</sup>, or else such as presented in the Belgian Federal Security Plan<sup>34</sup>, which specifies: ‘[...] by “security” is meant a human right and a condition necessary for maintaining a lawful State’ and adding: ‘In the framework

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<sup>31</sup> *La prévention de la délinquance en Europe, Nouvelles stratégies*, under the direction of P. Hebberecht and F. Sack, L’Harmattan, 1997.

<sup>32</sup> It is also likely that the use of the term ‘crime prevention’ by European institutions was guided by the difficulty of translating other designations.

<sup>33</sup> Article 1 of the Law: ‘Security is a fundamental right and one of the conditions for the exercise of individual and collective freedoms. The State has the duty to ensure security by watching over the entire territory of the Republic, the defence of institutions and national interests, the respect of the laws, keeping the public peace and order, and the protection of persons and property.’

<sup>34</sup> Federal Security Plan, Ministry of Justice, 31 May 2001.

*of the development of the active social State, whose cornerstones are economic growth and social protection, the handling of security by the authorities is imperative’.*

We again find these differences in the term ‘crime’, which will imply murder or activities on the order of organised crime in Spain and Italy, whereas in the United Kingdom, it refers to criminally qualified infractions and disorder, which more directly concerns the social behaviour that affects the quality of life of citizens.

These differences of concepts are not insignificant, and the work carried out in the context of this project has brought out that the notions have a real impact on the way local players think about the fight against insecurity and, consequently, on their way of perceiving their own field of intervention and the orientation of policies they engage. All the local players questioned agreed in considering that the crime prevention work they are carrying out consists, according to one of the participants, of creating a *‘force of calmness or composure’*, thus excluding the hardest forms of crime from their field of action (at least from the viewpoint of their impact but not systematically of their causes). While crime prevention may be defined as *‘the intervention on the causes of crime in order to reduce their unexpected appearance and impact’*<sup>35</sup>, it is equally necessary to clarify the notion of crime prevention in the European States. It is distinguished in the first place from dissuasion, which is directly linked to the functioning of criminal law. Next, prevention concerns both prevention of victimation and of going through with an act. Finally, it can be situational, i.e., avoiding the criminal act by the implementation of techno-preventive measures such as video surveillance, or offender-oriented, and would, in this case, be based on an analysis of insecurity in terms of the failures of economic and social policies.

### ***1.2.2. The development of national crime prevention policies in the United Kingdom, Belgium and France***

It was especially beginning in the 1980s that European countries developed new discourses and tools in the area of crime prevention. They thereby reoriented their criminal policies towards partnership and the local level. It is primarily in Belgium and the United Kingdom<sup>36</sup> that the governments, strongly influenced by neo-liberalism and a questioning of the welfare state, were the first to develop new prevention policies. The French case differs to the degree that the current crime prevention policy derives from the impetus given by the local level.

One can consider that the launching of the *Five Towns Initiative* in 1986, under the impetus of the government of Margaret Thatcher, followed, two years later, by the *Safer Cities* programme, which consisted of financing crime prevention activities at the local level, marked a turning point in the policy of the **United Kingdom** by favouring the emergence of a crime prevention policy. It was primarily a question of developing a cross-disciplinary approach in the fight against crime on the part of administrations, of making populations

<sup>35</sup> P. Eklom, *The Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity: A Framework for Crime Reduction Toolkit*, 2001

<sup>36</sup> Here, we mention only the countries concerned by the study. However, it is advisable to add the Netherlands, whose government sought to implement a prevention policy very early on. In 1979, a National Prevention Bureau within the Police had been set up, and, in 1983, the work of the Roethof Commission had insisted on the implementation of a prevention policy at the national level, the involvement of representatives of civil society in the prevention policies, and the necessity of encouraging co-operation and partnership at the local level. Launched in 1985, the *Society and Crime* programme, lying within previous discussions, had thus permitted financing nearly 200 crime prevention projects at the local level.

aware of their responsibilities and promoting the involvement of the private sector in prevention (given concrete expression the same year by the setting up of the *Crime Concern* organisation). However, the political power in place had carefully avoided giving new powers to the local authorities that were, for the most part, in the hands of the Labour Party. According to Crawford, the projects thus implemented suffered from ‘a lack of democracy’ to the degree that the Conservative government did not consider ‘that it was mandated by the local population or that a link of political representation existed for the members of the steering committee of the Safer Cities programme’<sup>37</sup>.

Written in 1991, the Morgan Report, which, in a certain way echoing the Bonnemaïson Report in France (1982), marked the most significant ideological turning point by bringing to the fore the necessity of a joint approach to crime prevention while underscoring the shortcomings of local prevention policies due to the absence of elected members in the steering organisations. The report’s conclusions having been rejected by the government, it was necessary to wait until July 1998 for the new Labour government to institute a new policy by promulgating the Crime and Disorder Act<sup>38</sup>. This took up in part the conclusions of the Morgan Report and introduced two major innovations<sup>39</sup>, which modified the panorama of crime prevention. On the one hand, it introduced new units specialised in juvenile delinquency (Youth Offender Teams), with which every local authority had to provide itself. On the other hand, it called for local authorities and local police forces (the ‘responsible authorities’) to implement a local strategy for reduction of crime and ‘disorders’. The *Community Safety Partnership* (approximately 375 in 2002), thus set up, is based on an analysis of crime and the establishment of a joint action plan that must be reviewed every three years. An assessment of the actions undertaken allows for stressing that these local partnerships reflect more the orientations defined at the national level (fight against domestic violence, burglaries and drug-related crime) than at the local level, notably because the financing came in large part from the national level, which thereby maintained control over the priorities.

In **Belgium**, it was in 1985 that the government, spurred on by the increase of crime, a decrease in the elucidation rate, and criticism of its police apparatus<sup>40</sup>, gave the point of departure for the development of a national—primarily situational—crime prevention policy that led to the setting up of a *National Crime Prevention Council* at the national level, and the *Crime Prevention Commissions* at the provincial level. It was necessary to wait until 1988 and the launching of a new action programme, commonly designated ‘The Pentecost Plan’, following the Bourgeois Report (30 April 1990), for the government to favour the establishment of a crime prevention policy ‘with greater social and local content’. This programme provided for, notably, the establishment of systematic consultation at the provincial and local levels, between burgomasters, the public Ministry, the three police forces (pentagonal consultation) and the local development of crime prevention.

Strongly influenced by criticism of its institutions<sup>41</sup> and police apparatus, the Belgian government also had to face up to an electoral breakthrough<sup>42</sup> of the far right in Flanders and

<sup>37</sup> A. Crawford, ‘Les politiques de sécurité locale et de prévention de la délinquance en Angleterre et au Pays de Galles: nouvelles stratégies et nouveaux développements’, in *Déviance et Société*, 2001.

<sup>38</sup> Available at the following Internet address: <http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts.htm>

<sup>39</sup> On this subject: Dr Sohail Husain, *The Crime and Disorder Act, A briefing by Crime Concern*, 30 June 2002.

<sup>40</sup> On this subject: Pierre Vanbellingen, *Le nouveau paysage policier: Des origines aux premières leçons d’une intégration locale*, university thesis, Jean Constant School of Criminology, University of Liège, 2001.

<sup>41</sup> Dewit, Waele and Magnoste underscore as follows: ‘In no European country is the rate of confidence in central institutions so low. For more than the past two years, only one Belgian out of five has expressed relative

elaborated an *Emergency Programme on Problems of Society* aimed at guaranteeing citizen security by reinforcing the prevention actions and the fight against petty crime. Shortly thereafter, on 9 June 1992, the Cabinet's adoption of a policy note on citizen security<sup>43</sup> was given concrete form through the implementation of *Safety and Society Contracts* drawn up in September 1992 with the country's five large cities<sup>44</sup> and seven Brussels districts<sup>45</sup>. A department of the Ministry of the Interior, the *Permanent Secretariat for Prevention Policy* (SPP), was set up shortly thereafter in order to ensure the follow-through and supervision of local initiatives. These contracts hinged on a prevention section and a police section. The action plan of the *Prevention Contracts* (from which the police section had been cut) was added for towns having lesser insecurity problems. The stated objective of these plans was to help the towns fight insecurity by subsidising projects<sup>46</sup> implemented by them and to participate in the improvement of living conditions in neighbourhoods and for the inhabitants. This plan, which was renewed annually by the federal authorities and modified on several occasions, is henceforth consolidated under the 'Safety and Prevention Contracts' appellation (74 contracts of this type in 2002).

During the same period, *France* also instituted a crime prevention policy that is based on principles common to those just mentioned for the United Kingdom and Belgium. It is distinguished from them by its origin, which stems, to a large extent, from the motivating ability of a deputy mayor, Gilbert Bonnemaïson<sup>47</sup>, author of a 1982 report entitled *Facing criminality: prevention, repression, solidarity*<sup>48</sup>. Proclaiming a pragmatic approach and refusing to take sides in the debate of the time on the causes of criminality (whether they be social or individual), he succeeded, within the *National Council of Crime Prevention*, in mobilising elected officials across the spectrum and promoting a policy in favour of neighbourhoods in difficulty. In 1983, the *Town Crime Prevention Councils* were launched, veritable authorities of consultation and planning of crime prevention programmes at the local level, which still remain to the present day the managing organ for these policies in towns<sup>49</sup>.

However, the prevention policy long remained the responsibility of a more overall policy, the policy of the city, co-ordinated by a special organisation, created in 1988, the Interdepartmental Delegation for the City, having a prevention unit and now placed under the authority of the Ministry for the City. The 1990s were marked by a profound transformation of the French security landscape, notably with the creation, in 1991, within the Ministry of the

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*confidence in the action of the federal government*', excerpt from *Gouverner la Belgique*, Presses Universitaires de France, 1999.

<sup>42</sup> On the occasion of the legislative elections of 24 November 1991.

<sup>43</sup> This note envisaged the allocation of additional funds to towns on condition that they respect the national priorities, especially the action on the social causes of crime.

<sup>44</sup> Antwerp, Brussels, Charleroi, Gent and Liège.

<sup>45</sup> Anderlecht, Forest, Ixelles, Molenbeek, Saint-Gilles, Saint-Josse and Schaerbeek.

<sup>46</sup> These projects were to focus explicitly on either the fight against criminality (for example, the hiring of additional police officials), on projects of situational prevention; or on prevention aimed at particularly fragilised populations faced with crime phenomena (elderly or handicapped people...); or the prevention of professions at risk (doctors, pharmacists, healthcare personnel, certain categories of freelancers...); or keeping an eye on groups which might be of a nature to witness delinquent practices develop.

<sup>47</sup> The action of Gilbert Bonnemaïson extended to the European and international levels. He is the founder of organisations such as the European Forum for Urban Security (Paris, France) and the International Centre for Crime Prevention (Montreal, Quebec).

<sup>48</sup> G. Bonnemaïson, *Face à la délinquance: prévention, répression, solidarité*, Mayors' Commission on Security, Report to the Prime Minister, La Documentation française.

<sup>49</sup> Following the change of government that occurred in France in May 2002, a modification of action plans is to be expected. It would likely concern abandoning the *Town Crime Prevention Councils* and the creation of *Local Security and Crime Prevention Contracts*.

Interior, of an organisation specialised in questions of domestic security, the *Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Sécurité Intérieure*, and with the promulgation of the *Orientation and Programming for Security Law* (1995), which underscores the importance of the involvement of local authorities in crime prevention plans. Similarly, this decade saw the launching of numerous plans related to security and primarily orientated towards the organisation of police forces: the reorganisation of the national police (1996), a law on municipal police and the generalisation of the reform of community policing (2000).

On 28 October 1997, in the image of the *Community Safety Partnership* in the United Kingdom and the *Safety and Prevention Contracts* in Belgium, the French government launched the Local Safety Contracts (603 as of the summer of 2002), a contractual plan established by the mayor, the representative of the State (the prefect) and Justice (the State prosecutor), but extended to other partners. These contracts, whose methodology was clarified in a practical guide intended for local players<sup>50</sup>, is based on a preliminary analysis of crime and the feeling of insecurity. They include two sections, one relating to crime prevention, the other to the co-ordination of police forces. However, they are distinguished from the British and Belgian partnerships by supervision that is less strict on the part of the supralocal authorities, in particular by the fact that these do not attribute financing to cities as directly.

### ***1.2.3. Prevention policies in Germany, Spain and Italy***

Owing to the resistance that is due to their administrative organisation, as well as to their history, Germany, Spain and Italy have, more belatedly than others, undertaken the implementation of a real crime prevention strategy based on common tools. From the point of view of setting up local co-operation organisations, what is at stake in Germany and, to a lesser degree, in Spain, is more a question of formalising or institutionalising local practices at the national level, whereas in other countries such as Italy, the centralised nature of safety policies long undermined the role of local co-operations other than the one offering a national policy on the local scale.

In *Spain*, the policies of the crime prevention field are, in a certain way, the expression of a democratic transition that took place later than in other European states. As Recasens stresses<sup>51</sup>, they were ‘the big losers, which, moreover, suffered from the greatest tensions at the State level, because of decentralisation and the lack of co-ordination’. It was the most law-and-order policies that were implemented and which, by nature, primarily concerned the police forces<sup>52</sup>. These policies concern, first and foremost, the area of terrorism, but also drug addiction and juvenile delinquency. There remains the fact that, at this moment, there is no development of joint strategies, even though consultation organisations do exist here and there, notably in the city of Barcelona, in Catalonia.

As for *Italy*, which, like Spain, targeted its safety and crime prevention policies on terrorism, organised crime and the fight against juvenile delinquency, the development of crime prevention policies long suffered on account of a highly developed centralised conception of

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<sup>50</sup> *Guide pratique pour les Contrats locaux de sécurité*, La Documentation française, 1998.

<sup>51</sup> A. Recasens I Brunet, ‘Politiques de sécurité et prévention dans l’Espagne des années 1990’, in *Déviante et Société*, 2001.

<sup>52</sup> Spain is the European country where the rate of police surveillance (number of policemen in relation to the population) is the highest in Europe: 486 per 100,000. It is followed by Italy (471 per 100,000), France (408 per 100,000), then Belgium (377 pour 100,000).



security. This was made the object of a reaffirmation by Law No.121 of April 1981, reforming the status of the state police and which stated that the prefect is the provincial authority in public security. This same law also set up provincial public safety committees on which sat, under the prefect's authority, the State services in charge of these matters, with the exception of the legal departments. It was not until the election of the mayor by direct universal suffrage, in 1991, that a breach was opened in this traditional organisation and that the local elected officials demanded the exercise of real power in crime prevention policies at the local level.

The Safety protocols signed between the prefectures and municipalities, which henceforth concern some sixty cities—the first of which was signed in Modena in February 1998—, are the result of this re-organisation of competences and responsibilities in favour of local elected officials. Although they do not organise a transfer of powers, they allow for the co-ordination of distinct competences between mayors and prefects. This evolution was acknowledged legislatively through the Law of 27 July 1999 opening the provincial safety committee up to the mayor of provincial county town and the elected provincial president.

Finally, as concerns *Germany*, the federal system naturally orientates the construction and implementation of safety policies towards each of the 16 *Länder* of which it is made up, this not favouring a unity of crime prevention practices and policies. Furthermore, the fact that crime prevention was long considered a matter of police duties, the absence of specialised organisations or else the low willingness of local powers to take part in prevention prompted some to describe Germany as a developing nation in this area<sup>53</sup>.

However, certain *Länder*, in the front rank of which Schleswig-Holstein<sup>54</sup>, followed by Hesse and Lower Saxony, proved to be precursors by setting up Crime Prevention Councils (*Kriminalpräventiveräte*), which bring together, in particular, representatives from the Ministries of Education, Social Affairs and Justice. Since the mid-1990s, the prevention landscape has changed noticeably. Since 1995, the German Crime Prevention Day, which takes place annually, ensures an exchange between prevention players, and there are now nearly 2,000 local crime prevention councils or related organisations<sup>55</sup> (*Kommunale Präventionsgremien*). The German Forum for Crime Prevention (*Deutsches Forum für Kriminalprävention*), set up in 2001, is in charge of developing a joint strategy and ensures co-operation between the Federation, the *Länder* and the towns.

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Despite the differences often proclaimed by the players of crime prevention policies, the States concur on several points. On the one hand, the safety policies have progressively broadened to the social field, and we now observe a relative autonomisation of the prevention sector. On the other hand, specialised organisations were set up at the national level in most countries: the Crime Reduction Unit in the United Kingdom, the Prevention Unit of the Interdepartmental Delegation for the City in France, the Permanent Secretariat for Prevention Policy in Belgium, and the German Forum for Crime Prevention. For the others, associations

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<sup>53</sup> W. Sohn, *Report on the Joint Approach in Crime Prevention – Germany*, European Committee for Criminal Problems, European Council, 2001.

<sup>54</sup> The Crime Prevention Council of the *Land* of Schleswig-Holstein was set up a few weeks before the reunification of Germany.

<sup>55</sup> The Federal Criminal Investigation Department (*Bundeskriminalamt*) makes an inventory of a large number of local crime prevention practices: <http://www.bka.de>

are playing a notable unifying role, primarily the Italian Forum for Urban Safety and, to a lesser degree, the Spanish Forum for Urban Safety. Finally, partnership has become the essential answer to the increase in crime and the demand for security.

### 1.3. The emergence of a European crime prevention policy

#### 1.3.1. A relatively recent construction

The European Urban Charter<sup>56</sup>, proclaimed in 1992 and which brings together a series of principles on proper urban management, is a precursory document. Indeed, it constitutes a major effort in the elaboration of a body of action principles concerning crime prevention meant to transcend national policies by basing itself on the pertinence of this policy at the city level. Gilbert Bonnemaïson's influence on the wording of the sixth theme of the Charter, *Urban Safety and crime prevention*, is not alien to this deliberately local approach and the principles stated therein.

#### European Urban Charter (Excerpts)

##### Theme 6. Urban Safety and crime prevention

##### **PRINCIPLES**

1. A coherent Safety and crime prevention policy must be based on prevention, law enforcement and mutual support.
2. A local Safety policy must be based on up-to-date comprehensive statistics and information.
3. Crime prevention involves every member of the community.
4. An effective urban Safety policy depends on close co-operation between the police and the local community.
5. A local anti-drug policy must be defined and applied.
6. Programmes for preventing relapse and developing alternatives to incarceration are essential.
7. Support for victims is a key component of any local urban Safety policy
8. Crime prevention must be recognised as a social priority and command increased financial resources.

Concerning the European Union, the development of a crime prevention model came later. While the Stockholm Conference (1996) examined the link between crime prevention and social exclusion, it was the Amsterdam Treaty that marked an important step in the area of crime prevention at the European Union level.

Indeed, in its Article 29 it mentions crime prevention (and not organised crime) amongst the policies of the European Union working towards an area of freedom, security and justice.

<sup>56</sup> European Urban Charter, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE), European Council, 1992.

**Treaty of Amsterdam (Excerpts)****Article 29**

Without prejudice to the powers of the European Community, the Union's objective shall be to provide citizens with a high level of protection within an area of freedom, security and justice, by developing common action among the Member States in the fields of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters and by preventing and combating racism and xenophobia.

That objective shall be achieved by preventing and combating crime, organised or otherwise, in particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms trafficking, corruption and fraud [...].

Subsequently, the European Council of Tampere (1999) stressed the importance of this objective in its conclusions, calling for the integration of crime prevention in the strategies for combating crime and setting study priorities, which would then be taken up by the *European Crime Prevention Network* and the European funding line, *Hippocrates*<sup>57</sup>.

**European Council of Tampere (Excerpts)****VIII. Preventing crime at the level of the Union**

41. The European Council calls for the integration of crime prevention aspects into actions against crime as well as for the further development of national crime prevention programmes. Common priorities should be developed and identified in crime prevention, in the external and internal policy of the Union, and be taken into account when preparing new legislation.

42. The exchange of best practices should be developed, the network of competent national authorities for crime prevention and co-operation between national crime prevention organisations should be strengthened, and the possibility of a Community-funded programme should be explored for these purposes. The first priorities for this co-operation could be juvenile, urban and drug-related crime.

Other dates, such as the Praia da Falesia Conference (4-5 May 2000), which was the occasion for defining the guiding lines for future actions in prevention at the European level, brought out the involvement of the European Union in prevention policies.

In general, prevention was broached in the European Union:

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<sup>57</sup> On 28 June 2001, the Council of Ministers of the European Union adopted the Hippocrates programme, a programme for encouragement, exchanges, training and co-operation in the field of crime for the years 2001 and 2002. The main work lines retained were: the horizontal themes concerning general crime as much as organised crime (the feeling of insecurity and victimation, the relationship between organised crime and overall crime, measuring criminal phenomena), the themes concerning general crime (juvenile delinquency, urban crime, drug-related crime) and themes concerning organised crime (measuring criminal phenomena, organisation of partnerships, the use of reassuring techniques in preventing organised crime, the co-operation between the public authorities and companies' internal security departments, the feasibility of the 'crime proofing' approach and the evolution of risks inherent to economic, technological and social changes).

- ‘vertically’, i.e., in relation to certain types of crime such as trafficking in persons or the sexual exploitation of children;
- and ‘horizontally’, in particular when it was a question of studying crime victims within the European Union.

### ***1.3.2. The notion of crime prevention at the European level***

#### **⇒ Crime**

Although crime encompasses criminal acts committed by individuals, the European Commission distinguishes between:

- crime in the literal sense, i.e., acts qualified as crimes in national legislation;
- criminality, which corresponds to a less serious but more frequent level of criminal offence (e.g., thefts, receiving stolen goods, muggings, fraud, etc.);
- the violence that is tending to spread in the most diverse environments (in the street, sports stadiums, schools, family organisations, etc.);
- and incivility, which, without constituting a criminal offence, can create an atmosphere of tension and insecurity.

#### **⇒ Prevention**

For the European Commission<sup>58</sup>, crime prevention covers all the activities that contribute to stopping or reducing crime as a social phenomenon, both quantitatively and qualitatively, be it through permanent, structured measures or through ad hoc initiatives.

These activities are characteristic of all the players capable of playing a preventive role, whether from the public (legal, law-enforcement and social services), volunteer (associations) or private (businesses) sectors.

As the States do, the European Union distinguishes between different approaches to prevention, depending on whether they concentrate on victims, perpetrators, persons or groups at risk, or on risky situations. It is also necessary to differentiate between categories of prevention measures according to whether their aim is the reduction of opportunities, the reduction of social and economic factors that favour the development of crime, or the prevention of victimisation.

### ***1.3.3. Objectives and priorities of crime prevention for the European Union***

This is a matter of:

- Reducing the opportunities that facilitate crime;

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<sup>58</sup> Here, we refer to the Communication of the Commission to the Council and European Parliament, *Crime Prevention in the European Union – Reflection on Common Orientations and Propositions in Favour of Community Funding*, COM(2000) 786 final

- Attenuating the factors that facilitate entering into crime as well as relapse;
- Avoiding victimation;
- Reducing the feeling of insecurity;
- Promoting a culture of legality;
- Preventing the infiltration of economic structures by criminal elements.

In order to achieve these objectives, the European Union hopes to ensure better co-ordination of existing policies. Thus, ties will have to be made with social policy or even urban policy (as such, the Parliament, the Council of Regions and the European Commission stress the urban dimension of crime prevention policies in their work).

Furthermore, the Commission supported the initiative taken by the French presidency and Sweden concerning the creation of a European network of crime prevention focussing in particular on the points raised during the European Council in Tampere.

More precisely, the breakdown of the work priorities of this organisation is:

1. juvenile delinquency:

- the risk factors: alcohol, drugs, limited economic and social resources;
- the impact of programmes aimed at behaviour modification;
- judicial and reparative practices;
- the partnership between the police and social services for preventing juvenile delinquency.

2. Urban crime

Here, the Commission mentions 'the events that effect life at the local level', more particularly: burglaries, criminal acts against automobiles and persons as well as graffiti and vandalism.

Here, priority measures will concern social mediation (resolution of conflicts), the reduction of crime through urban renewal and architecture plans and the finalising of norms for automobile building.

3. Drug-related crime

- Law-enforcement and prevention measures;
- Prevention through health and social policies

4. The links between organised crime and crime in general

5. Partnership

These priorities and main work lines are, in reality, the fruit of reflection by European institutions on the assessment of crime prevention policies undertaken in the Member States:

- The development of an interdisciplinary approach;
- The articulation of safety and accompaniment policies (social and educational policies, etc.);

- The development of the partnership between prevention players with the motive that prevention is effective only if based on all components of society (notion of co-production);
- The development of approaches that favour proximity to citizens (plans of community police and justice).

Henceforth, the European thinking that tends to favour a model of crime prevention policy is therefore not autonomous, as a good number of national and local players proclaim, but constitutes a coherent synthesis of current initiatives and practices.

## 2. Crime prevention at the local level

### 2.1. The approach followed by cities for the implementation of a crime prevention policy

Faced with the multiplication of crime prevention initiatives within cities, the latter are searching for a renewal of methodology. Furthermore, while the question of 'How to go about it?' is being asked about the realisation of a safety diagnosis or for establishing an action plan, it is also asked concerning the consultation of citizens in setting up crime prevention policies.

#### 2.1.1. Cities are improving their knowledge of insecurity: the diagnosis step

All cities seek to respond locally to the problems that are posed. And faced with the insufficiency of police statistics for taking reality into account, they have all undertaken steps in view of improving knowledge of insecurity. However, the quality of the tools set up remains unequal. Even in countries where the State has not launched joint crime prevention policies, i.e., Germany, Spain and Italy, the cities have nonetheless sought to improve their instruments.

In 1999, the city of Girona carried out a **victimisation survey** in order to determine the types of crimes of which city inhabitants were victims, distinguishing between muggings, auto theft, burglaries, attacks on businesses and shop-lifting, and acts of vandalism. This survey was however carried out using a relatively small sample (364 persons), and, owing to that, its results remain hardly exploitable.

Confronted with the difficulty of obtaining information on victims and perpetrators of crimes, the city of Modena undertook a similar process, but with a notable difference from Girona: it is repeated every year.

In June 1998, on the decision of the Crime Prevention Council, the city of Bonn commissioned a **crime analysis** from the city university (in the framework of a specific project entitled *KRABBE*), which strove to be more complete. It is broken down into two parts: on the one hand, an explanation of police statistics and, on the other, a survey of 4,000 city residents. The part relating to the presentation of police statistics is relatively detailed and proposes putting the situation of Bonn, in the *Land* of NordRhein Westfahlen, into perspective. The section devoted to the survey pursued two aims: gaining information about crime victims (a sort of victimisation survey) and on **the population's feeling of insecurity**. Concerning this feeling of insecurity, the results are particularly satisfying for the city since two-thirds of the persons questioned affirmed that they felt safe. However, as in Girona, the analysis was not repeated and thus did not permit studying the evolution of the feeling of insecurity.

It is indeed in the Anglo-Saxon, Belgian and French cities that the tools are the most detailed. In Marseilles, a **local safety diagnosis** was carried out in March 1999 by a private urban-

safety consulting firm<sup>59</sup>. This diagnosis proceeds from the method developed by the national authorities, which, as in Belgium, supposes the realisation of this diagnosis before the realisation of the action plan (the *Local Safety Contract*). This diagnosis is relatively elaborate to the extent that it proposes, in addition to a 'classic' analysis of the major categories of crimes, **a contextualisation of the crimes in the area** (differentiating the criminal situation in the various sectors of the cities). Furthermore, the steps taken assimilate more clearly into a shared diagnosis, to the extent that the analysis of data stems from several organisations and not just from the police. In Liège, a local safety diagnosis was undertaken in similar fashion but is carried out on an annual basis.

It is the Anglo-Saxon cities that produce the most advanced crime analyses. On the one hand, the sources of data used are much more numerous. Thus, **the links between crime and socio-economic conditions** are more developed than in other cities<sup>60</sup>. The services of the city of Brent set up a system of cartographic information as recommended by the Home Office in order to make a connection between police statistics and 21 socio-economic indicators. On the other hand, **the number of partners** consulted and involved in the realisation of the diagnosis amounts to more than 30 organisations in Luton.

However, this advance of Anglo-Saxon cities must be put into perspective. It involves sizeable financial resources, a capacity for strong mobilisation and a relatively long realisation time (the diagnosis of the city of Luton was begun in August 2001 and finalised in March 2002). Furthermore, the multiplication of sources of data used constitutes a challenge for cities to the degree that not all partners have exploitable information. Finally, as a note from the Home Office stresses, marked differences persist between the conclusions of the diagnoses and the priorities defined, without the latter always being explained<sup>61</sup>.

### ***2.1.2. The cities provide themselves with action plans: the formalisation of joint strategies***

Once the acknowledgement of insecurity and social demand had been established, four out of the seven cities studied now have strategies formalised in action plans. Once again, it is these cities whose countries have set up more voluntarist policies, that favour this formalisation: in England and Wales, with the launching of the Community Safety Partnerships; in Belgium, with the Safety and Prevention Contracts programme; and in France, with the Local Safety Contracts (the Italian example is much more clearly a question of organisation powers between the State and the town). In all cases, it is therefore the national policy considered that imposes this approach. However, whilst other cities do not formalise in this way their joint involvement in the setting up and follow-through of safety policies, the fact remains that they are providing themselves with joint management organisations<sup>62</sup>.

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<sup>59</sup> France seems to be one of the rare European States with private companies proposing such services (approximately 70 firms). In the other countries, the cities resort rather to universités (as in Bonn) or larger organisations such as Crime Concern in the United Kingdom.

<sup>60</sup> Thus in France, the Local Security Diagnosis of Marseilles points out: *'Moreover, it is quite remarkable to observe that there exists hardly any social, economic or demographic variable that is significantly correlated to crime committed in Marseilles, as was clearly shown in the studies carried out by the Cabinet Dubouchet [the private firm involved in realising the diagnosis], prior to the Local Security Contract'*.

<sup>61</sup> C. Phillips, M. Considine and R. Lewis, *A review of audits and strategies produced by crime and disorders partnership in 1999*, Brief Note 8/00, Home Office, November 2000.

<sup>62</sup> See part 2.2.2. of the report.



It should be emphasised that the strategies which are formalised in England and Wales, and Belgium and France, differ on several points, even though the stated objective is similar: the reduction of crime and feeling of insecurity.

On the one hand, the French and Belgian strategies are a matter of a *vertical logic of formalisation by contract* with the State and are therefore essentially the expression of an agreement between those two levels of government in the implementation of shared means to be developed at the local level. In this sense, they come close to the Italian example even though they propose, in greater detail, the actions to be set up and the means for achieving them. The Anglo-Saxon strategies proceed more from a *horizontal logic* whose objective is solely to constitute a local action network and define the dividing up of tasks between the local players.

On the other hand, the Anglo-Saxon approach is the only one that obliges cities to determine their objectives precisely, not in terms of means but also in terms of results. The Home Office sums up this extremely rationalised procedure for the players of other European countries with the **SMART** concept: **S**pecific, **M**easurable, **A**chievable, **R**ealistic, **T**ime-scaled. This way of building action thus involves the setting of objectives backed up by figures, for example, the decrease of juvenile delinquency by X%.

These differences lead to *different evaluation methods*. In Italy and France, evaluation remains very largely motivated by local players and was not carried out in Modena or Marseilles. In Belgium, the evaluation, carried out annually by the city services, consists, above all, of the State's supervision of the funding that it contributes to the plan. Finally, in England and Wales, the results of actions are quantified every three years and registered in the new strategies (2002–2005). As an example, the city of Luton's 2002–2005 strategy thus mentions: *'In the course of the plan's implementation, 91% of the objectives were entirely or partially achieved; the following year was marked by an increase in success with a total of 97% of the objectives entirely or partially attained [...]*'. This phrase is likely to surprise a good number of local players from other European countries<sup>63</sup>...

### ***21.3. The consultation of inhabitants is at the heart of democratic preoccupations of local crime prevention policies***

The procedure for the setting up and follow-through of a local crime prevention policy does not only consist of reducing crime but also reducing the community's feeling of insecurity. The cities have therefore developed tools aimed at evaluating this social demand and taking account of their actions.

The cities' first instrument for knowing the nature of its inhabitants' demand consists of **neighbourhood committees** in which they can express themselves. In Marseilles, organisations of this type, run by volunteer workers, were set up more than 100 years ago, and elected officials as well as the police are regularly invited. The cities of Modena and Girona also have a long tradition of citizen participation in public life, and it is the same in Luton, which boasts several neighbourhood centres that are consulted on a regular basis on questions relative to safety.

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<sup>63</sup> The shortage of evaluation arrangements for the cities studied should be considered in connection with the tools that are provided them by national organisations. Thus, the Home Office put at the disposal of cities an evaluation methodology, a procedure that has not been followed by the other countries studied. The methodology is available at the following address: <http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/evaluation.htm>

Next, a majority of the cities studied launched **consultations** of their citizens, as was mentioned above, with surveys on victimation and/or on the feeling of insecurity. In Marseilles, a survey had been carried out in 1999 on citizens' expectations. This consisted of an analysis with city agents 'whose function or situation predisposes them to being familiar with crime and the feeling of insecurity' and an analysis of letters received by the institutions. In Luton, 9,000 questionnaires were sent out between September and November 2001, in view of realising the safety diagnosis.

However, according to nearly all the players in the field who were questioned, it remains very difficult to organise **specific meetings** on the theme of safety to the degree that, most often, they include the participation of a large number of persons making demands who would be unable to faithfully take into account the expectations of the population. Here once again, the Anglo-Saxon cities distinguish themselves by their approach, which takes into account minorities and facilitates making contact with certain segments of the population. Questioned about the difficulty of gathering information that way, the head of the Brent Community Safety Partnership indicated the methodological bias she uses: *'It is impossible to organise specific meetings. In Brent, we chose to proceed otherwise: we invite ourselves to meetings in the neighbourhoods, during which we briefly present our activities. That way, the inhabitants are informed about our actions and more easily confide their expectations without this systematically taking on an exacerbated protest dimension.'*

Finally, in spite of all these difficulties, the cities are also tending to develop their **public relations concerning safety** to take account of their activities, particularly through the media, which they customarily use (city newspaper, etc.). They sometimes print up presentation brochures laying out their crime prevention services and general objectives, as is the case in Liège. Remains the fact that local elected officials are still largely reticent about communicating on the subject of crime and providing very detailed information in that sense. In this perspective, the city of Brent's Internet website, specifically dedicated to crime prevention, constitutes an exception<sup>64</sup>.

## 2.2. Organisation of the crime prevention arrangements on the city scale

Here, it is a matter of presenting the means set up by cities for following through or even reorienting the actions they implement. Whilst the organisations differ from one city to the next, we observe that the structuring of crime prevention services and the formation of local coalitions (steering committees or equivalent organisations) constitute a common solution.

### 2.2.1. Towards a structuring of crime prevention services within cities

Even though crime prevention is tending to become a full-fledged policy, it does not always dependant upon a specific department in the cities. Whereas this is the case in Brent, Liège, Luton and Modena, where a specific service is set up, such is not the case in Bonn or Girona. Thus one may consider in Bonn that the field of prevention is both a matter of the police forces and the Delegation for Youth, whereas in Girona, it falls under the responsibility of the deputy mayor in charge of the municipal police. Finally, in Marseilles, as opposed to a good

<sup>64</sup> <http://www.brent.gov.uk/crimezone>

number of French cities that have a sole delegation for safety, the prevention sector is principally a matter for the deputy mayor in charge of the *Communal Crime Prevention Council*, but also, to a lesser extent, the deputy mayor in charge of the municipal police.

Despite this *structuring phenomenon*, the on-site visits have occasionally brought out the unclear organisation of crime prevention of the city's services. Amongst the cities having a specific sector, only Liège is in a position to provide a detailed organisation chart of its prevention service. The local players do not seem to be concerned by this lack of clarity as regards outsiders, considering that in most cases '*an organisation chart is not necessary, we all have it in our mind*'.

In the most structured services, the crime prevention teams are systematically made up of a department head, a financial agent and project leaders in charge of specific questions. However, functions may vary from one city to another. Thus, in Brent, the city sectors are divided up between the project leaders in charge of specific questions (juvenile delinquency, etc.) so as to guarantee, in case of trouble, the presence of the same interlocutor for the inhabitants (or even for the other departments concerned) and enable the follow-through of the history of a neighbourhood. The fruit of the Anglo-Saxon approach, which takes minorities into account, another specificity of the two British cities is the importance accorded to the idea of having persons in charge of questions affecting particular publics being close to them.

The organisation of Liège's prevention department clearly illustrates *the necessity for cities to combine political involvement, overall co-ordination, the setting up of concrete projects and dealing with administrative constraints*:

- The Contract Manager: here, this is the Burgomaster, represented by his principal private secretary. He embodies the political follow-through of the city's safety dossier;
- The prevention official defines his function as follows: '*It is, first of all, a matter of bringing about opportunities for encounters between persons who are not in the habit of speaking to each other and who have a mutual problem to resolve. Then it is necessary to bring up, from the field towards the town authorities, information on what would be good to do so that things go better. And finally, it is necessary to manoeuvre a series of different departments, made up of diversified authorities and institutionally joined to different organisations, in view of implementing concrete projects issuing from dialogue with the players in the field and retained by town authorities*'<sup>65</sup>;
- An administrative and financial co-ordinator who takes care of the management and financial follow-through of actions undertaken;
- An internal evaluator who is in charge of the on-going evaluation (implementation and effects) of those actions;
- The co-ordinators of the specific projects.

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<sup>65</sup> On the occasion of the public evaluation meeting of 16 October 2001.

This trend towards a differentiation and specialisation of tasks reflects *a more technical way of the dealing with the crime prevention field*. A city can henceforth have up to 120 persons assigned to its services (and involved in this sector) and manage budgets of up to £400,000/p.a. in Brent and €3,600,000 in Liège<sup>66</sup>. It is also the effect of strong pressure from certain States, which multiply the control procedures when they commit funding to the local level.

### ***2.2.2. The setting up of local coalitions and steering committees of plans constitutes a joint approach***

Crime prevention policies are cross-disciplinary, and consequently, their realisation involves a large number of players, whether from the public, private or volunteer sectors. The setting up of *ad hoc* structures ensuring the handling of arrangements is therefore a key element of safety management within a city and the effectiveness of the partnership constituted. As a French head points out: *'It is the coherence of the players and actions that is difficult to obtain, not the partners' involvement'*. Whilst contracts and other protocols make up the overall strategy, it is those organisations that ensure the supervision of the implementation of crime prevention measures and the necessary resourcefulness in decision-making.

These management structures of the measure are either unique or, in this latter case, multiple, whilst one commission is competent over all the measures, others are specialised and form sub-groups. Even in cities where the crime prevention sector is limited and not the object of a single, full-fledged department, there exists at least a management structure, which most often serves to symbolise the involvement of the elected officials.

Thus, a *Crime Prevention Council* was set up in Bonn in 1999, presided over by the mayor and meeting, at his initiative or that of the police chief, once or twice a year. In Girona, a decision-making body plays an equivalent role but remains primarily a police matter to the extent that it brings together the mayor, the deputy mayor in charge of safety and representatives of the municipal police and that of Catalonia.

In France and Italy, the organisations that are veritable permanent local coalitions<sup>67</sup> become more complex. As has already been mentioned, in Marseilles it is the *Local Crime Prevention Council* (CCPD) that fills this role. It holds a plenary meeting once a year at the initiative of the city mayor and then brings together the players in the field, the district mayors and partners of the Local Safety Contract. Furthermore, follow-through committees concerning each sector of the city can meet in order to follow and co-ordinate the actions more particularly undertaken on their territory. They can also draw up propositions for the higher authorities. Finally, thematic commissions, run by representatives from Justice, the State or Education, are in charge of analysing and developing particular strategies (access to Law, prevention of criminal relapse, juvenile delinquency, school violence, drug addiction, public transportation, sensitive areas and squats, and runaways). In Modena, it is a matter of the Provincial Committee for Public Order, a place for conception and follow-through on actions

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<sup>66</sup> The Security Contract of the City of Liège for 2002 represents funding up to €2,000,000, coming from the Ministry of the Interior, approximately €1,500,000 from the French-Speaking Region, and some €100,000 from the Ministry of Justice.

<sup>67</sup> We define 'local coalition' as a circumstantial understanding between power, parties, persons, etc. for joint action.

undertaken in the city, meeting every three weeks and on which sit the prefect, the mayor, the provincial president and representatives of the police forces.

In Liège, the Steering Committee brings together, on a monthly basis, most of the Safety and Prevention Contract team, to which are added the police commissioner as well as representatives of the city services concerned (for example, the Director of Social Aid).

Finally, in the United Kingdom, the implementation of Community Safety Partnerships favours a more complex overall structure of the plan within which the competences must be well defined. Thus, in Luton, the structure is broken down into four levels on which a player will be able to sit but will carry out different functions:

1. The main function of the *Stakeholders Group* is advising the *Executive Group*. The group is made up of 26 members, representing justice, the police, health, the University of Luton, the Chamber of Commerce, private organisations and associations, inhabitants, et al.
2. The *Executive Group* must ensure the effectiveness of the conformity of the action plan with the legal obligations set forth in the Crime and Disorder Act. It is made up of representatives of the police and various city services, as well as the team from the crime prevention department.
3. The *Implementations Groups* are in charge of the concrete implementation of the action plan for the area that concerns them. They consist of six limited groups dedicated to themes or specific priorities (e.g., juvenile delinquency). Every group is presided over by a representative who must give an account of actions undertaken to the *Executive Group*.
4. Finally, the *Crime and Disorder Managers Group* oversees the execution of actions in accordance with the directives of the *Executive Group*; it is made up of representatives from each of the six *Implementations Groups*.

The **composition of management structures** calls for several remarks. On the one hand, the composition of measures systematically involves the presence of the local authorities. As such, the presence of representatives from the city services does not constitute an innovation and ‘is only a simple application of the municipal competences of common law’<sup>68</sup>. It is indeed on the side of the presence of elected officials that the question of the involvement of local powers in the arrangements mentioned is placed. Contrary to the observations usually drawn up, this presence is effective in a majority of measures. Moreover, in a majority of European States, the mayor has important competences in safety matters. This is particularly a question of authorities concerning police as in France, where the mayor can create a municipal police, or else in Belgium, where the Burgomaster exercises his competences in terms of municipal police in the same way<sup>69</sup>.

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<sup>68</sup> A. Wyvekens, ‘Le partenariat dans la prévention de la criminalité: Réflexions sur la composition du partenariat, à partir de quelques exemples européens.’ Committee of experts on partnership in crime prevention, European Committee for Criminal Problems, European Council, 2001.

<sup>69</sup> In accordance with the Law of 7 December 1998, in the case where the local police area comprises several communes, the management and organisation of the local body is entrusted to a police college made up of burgomasters from the concerned area. However, in this latter case, each burgomaster remains responsible for the security of law and order and health on the territory of his town.

On the other hand, the police, unlike Justice, are omnipresent in all joint structures and at every step: the elaboration of safety diagnoses, definition of orientations and supervision of actions undertaken. The interviews carried out in the cities, in particular with representatives of associations, confirm this police resonance over the prevention actions. The police themselves acknowledge the scope of their action and sometimes attribute it to shortcomings of other institutions in terms of evaluation measures. A British policeman thus asserted: *'The Police remains the most important organisation in the partnership to the extent that it has at its disposal the majority of data that concern crime and because nearly all the partners need it for carrying out action'*.

Finally, the inhabitants or even the targeted publics remain the notable absentees in the production and follow-through of prevention policies. This is not specific and, despite innovative local experiments, is largely understood in the field of social policies<sup>70</sup>. The citizen is taken into consideration only when he or she expresses a request on his own initiative (letters to elected officials, voting in municipal elections, etc.) and remains considered a user at whom policies are aimed. The Anglo-Saxon cities are distinguished by their concern for involving the communities, e.g. the involvement of community representatives in Luton's *Stakeholders Group*.

### ***2.2.3. Two models of crime prevention policy management at the local level: State management and management by local authorities***

The study of the seven cities in the project brings out two management models for crime prevention policy: management is handled either by the national authorities or by the local authorities.

In the first case, it is the national authorities that handle the local measures. This is the case in Liège, Modena and Marseilles. These three cities have joint measures that necessitate formalisation by contract with the State. The involvement of the national level is expressed on the one hand, because the State, in the person of the prefect, is an obligatory signatory of the contract, this being the case in Marseilles and Modena. On the other hand, when it is the State that finances actions, it closely supervises the measure: such is the case in Liège.

It is in **Liège** that the influence of the national authorities is felt most strongly. Indeed, it is they that fund the large majority of actions undertaken every year in the framework of the Safety and Prevention Contract. The *Permanent Secretariat for Prevention Policy*, within the Ministry of the Interior, is in charge of ensuring the administrative and financial follow-through of contracts; local councillors carry out the evaluation of projects set up.

In the case of **Modena**, even though, as the private secretary to the Prefect of Modena emphasises, *'the mayor is the citizens' first interlocutor'*, the Prefect remains, in fact and by law, the manager of the safety strategy implemented in the city. The Safety Contract (*Contratto di Sicurezza*), signed 27 March 2000<sup>71</sup>, organises the co-ordination of

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<sup>70</sup> J.-P. Buffat, *Les polices partenariales et contractuelles de lutte favorisent-elles une approche intégrée et globale de la lutte contre l'exclusion social?*, European Forum for Urban Security, 2001.

<sup>71</sup> This Contract falls within the continuity of the Agreement Protocol signed in February 1998.

competences between the mayor and prefect: the former is entrusted with the prevention policy, whereas the latter keeps its law enforcement remit. As was previously mentioned, it is in fact he who presides over the Provincial Public Order Committee.

Finally, as concerns **Marseilles**, the *Local Safety Contract*, signed 29 March 1999, reflects the predominance of the State in the impetus of the city's crime prevention policy. This document is, in fact, signed by the regional prefect. Here, however, the resonance of the State in the follow-through of actions must be relativised to the extent that, as noted in an intermediary assessment carried out at the national scale<sup>72</sup>: '[...] the absence of a "State" CLS [Local Safety Contracts] co-ordinator, in face of the town CLS co-ordinator, constituted a real handicap, particularly in the largest départements'. The State does not directly finance the city for the setting up of an overall crime prevention strategy. Furthermore, despite the presence of several specialised public organisations, State management remains limited. The relative shortage of public expertise in the methodological support for setting up local measures has even pushed the State to shed light on the weakness of those implemented<sup>73</sup>.

In the other cities—Bonn, Brent, Girona and Luton—the measures are managed locally by the city services and remain under their control. However, the case of the British cities should be clearly distinguished from that of the other countries. Indeed, although the *Crime and Disorder Act* places the responsible authorities, i.e., the police and local authorities, in charge of the development and implementation of the crime prevention strategy (in the framework of the *Community Safety Partnership*), the resonance of national power is felt at several levels. On the one hand, the government regularly launches specific programmes (for example, concerning video surveillance or juvenile delinquency), which orient the priorities of local policies. As a representative of one British city confided: *'Although situational prevention, which is materialising notably through the use of video surveillance cameras, is developing sometimes to the detriment of social prevention, it's because the government is contributing funding in that sense!'* Furthermore, the Home Secretary puts a methodology at the disposal of local players, which, from the viewpoint of foreign experiences, seems quite developed<sup>74</sup> and which tends to unify local crime prevention practices<sup>75</sup>.

### **2.3. Local crime prevention policies display common priorities and carry out similar targeting**

Despite the differences inherent to national frameworks and the structures that ensue from them, the cities display common priorities, which are close to those set at the European level. They can be divided into three categories. The first concerns specific territories within cities where crime rates are higher or which are the most stigmatised. The second relates to priority publics, young people and the elderly, as well as 'high-risk professions'. Finally, the fight against drug addiction constitutes a common priority.

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<sup>72</sup> *Troisième Rapport de la Mission Interministérielle d'Évaluation des Contrats Local de Sécurité*, 2001.

<sup>73</sup> 'Certain contracts, however, are based on diagnoses that are hardly satisfying, since they were developed in too hasty a manner.[...] The partnership is still sometimes too narrow for taking into account all aspects of the action to be promoted.'. Interdepartmental circular of 7 June 1999.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Part 2.3.1. of the report.

<sup>75</sup> This methodology is available on Internet: <http://www.crime-reduction.gov.uk/toolkits>

The responses of cities in face of these action priorities can differ both in the method adopted as well as by the means implemented. Every major targeting category will consequently be illustrated by concrete projects set up by the local players.

### 2.3.1. Territorialised policies

The targeting of specific quarters within the city is a strong trend in local crime prevention policies. It can materialise through the setting up of technical plans (situational prevention) that aim at effective supervision of territories by the authorities. This is the case in video surveillance installations, particularly in Brent, which now has approximately 68 cameras, or else a similar installation planned for the Marseilles city centre. However, these particularly expensive arrangements<sup>76</sup> do not constitute the largest part of the responses aimed at difficult territories, and local players still have trouble evaluating their contribution.

The setting up of projects based on social prevention, which meet specific needs of a given neighbourhood, are to be found in all the cities studied. It is even explicitly mentioned in the Anglo-Saxon crime prevention strategies, which are sometimes characterised too schematically owing to their taking minorities into account. Thus in Brent, specific actions are undertaken aimed at the sectors of Kilburn and Wembley, where measures for the youngest publics have been taken. A **Wembley Youth Centre** was thereby established as of 1992, intended for the district's young people. They are offered cultural activities and sports (remedial schooling, initiation to music and dance), and police officers regularly come by to talk with them. Girona has established **civic centres** in each of the city's seven districts, intended especially for the youngest populations. These centres, some of which were partially financed by community funds, try particularly to collect useful sources of information (job hunting, etc.) and propose training (literacy, initiation in artistic activities, etc.).

Another objective of the projects directed at targeted territories is to fight more explicitly against the stigmatisation of these areas. Such is the case in the northern districts of the city of Bonn (in particular, the Dransdorf sector), considered as being especially hard hit by the low level of its inhabitants' financial resources. An increase in conflicts within the family as well as at school was the object of special attention on the part of the city's services. There, they launched the '**Tolerance to the 3<sup>rd</sup> power**' programme (*Toleranz Hoch Drei*)<sup>77</sup>, its objective being to enhance the image of those quarters and promote tolerance by improving the social integration of young people. Particular attention is paid so that all the projects undertaken in the context of the programme be the object of wide distribution on multimedia supports.

Finally, projects of importance can aim both at fighting insecurity and the feeling of insecurity of a specific territory, as is the case in Liège with the setting up of the **Permanent Safety Foyer** in the Bressoux-bas/Droixhe district. The objective of the measure thus deployed upon the decision of elected officials is to combine several programmes in this sector in a globalising perspective. The different phases of setting up the programme in this particularly difficult quarter, illustrate the methodology used in such a situation:

1. Immediate response to inhabitants' request: in 1999, upon implementation of the project, a citizens' movement making a great number of demands was rapidly set up,

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<sup>76</sup> For information only, the funding obtained by the city of Brent represented approximately £2,100,000.

<sup>77</sup> A presentation of this programme is available at the following address: <http://www.toleranz-hoch-drei.de>



to the degree that the situation in this district was termed ‘insurrectional’ by the city services. The project leader sent to be in contact with the population had to promise the inhabitants the ‘*permanent preventive presence*’ of police teams, on the one hand, and teams of civilians, on the other.

2. Development of a partnership with Justice so that the necessary judicial inquiries be made. This partnership led to arrests of the young people and adults most involved in the crime circuits and their remaining in detention. The Permanent Safety Foyer is in charge of quickly putting in the field interveners on the front line capable of making contact with the young people who occupy the neighbourhood streets.
3. Setting up the team: all the municipal agents likely to be involved in this type of mission are listed: directors of youth centres, sports instructors, directors of creative workshops, social workers and youth workers. They are then divided up into front-line and second-line interveners, the former receiving as a mission approaching the targeted public in three phases: an immersion phase; a dialogue phase and a phase of collecting demands, while explaining its mission as of the initial contact with the persons.
4. Analysis of the demand and needs: the listing of the young people’s demands was carried out, reviewed with them and then presented to those in charge of municipal services on the one hand and associations, on the other. However, little concrete follow-up resulted, aside from a direct action by the Permanent Safety Foyer itself.

The calming of the social mood was obtained by the joint action of the police, Justice and city services, and by the definition of co-operation methods concerning the exchange of information between those players. Thus, the police station submits disputes between neighbours that it is aware of to the neighbourhood mediator. He or she starts a mediation but withdraws as soon as one of the parties decides to file a complaint. In return, a monthly, personalised report is sent to the district police station. The district police station also informs the parental mediators when their intervention seems necessary. Furthermore, the functions were specified primarily concerning youth workers in the street: it is the civic education role that is put forward. The police does not expect them to play a mediation role in case of troubles of public order (such as disturbance of the peace, joy riding, etc.), except in the case where they had previously succeeded in establishing a relationship of trust with the young people concerned, which appears to authorise them to intervene.

### ***2.3.2. Policies aimed at specific publics: youth and persons at risk***

In addition to the necessity of meeting the specific needs of neighbourhoods within a city, another strong main line of crime prevention policies is that they are aimed at specific publics. The young<sup>78</sup> are obviously a priority of national and local policies and are most often the object of specific programmes of importance. Other publics are also the object of particular attention, such as the elderly, ethnic minorities or the most jeopardised populations and finally, high-risk professions (i.e., for those where the risks of victimation are considered greatest).

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<sup>78</sup> We previously mentioned that the term ‘young person’, as used by local players, does not necessarily refer to the age of civil majority. For more details, one will refer back to the first part of the present report.

- *Arrangements aimed at youth constitute a strong main line of local crime prevention policies*

Young people, as crime analysis indicates, are a common preoccupation for the local players. It would be proper to recall that the local players stress the involvement of young people in crime both as perpetrators and as victims. Arrangements set up are extremely varied and range from simple consciousness raising of those publics (as in the case of the youth centres described above) to much stricter supervision measures aimed at reinsertion in society. A common point of the experiences studied is that local players agree on setting up strategies which really involve young people and give them a sense of responsibility. As the director of the Wembley Youth Centre observed: *'The efforts that young people must make in the framework of the project are an essential condition for success'*. One of the specificities of the youth sector within crime prevention is perhaps its mobilising ability. It brings in a large number of players and, more particularly, those from the association sector, notably in the setting up of mediation or reinsertion plans. Here we present a few initiatives that are representative of what is at work in the cities studied.

In **Modena**, information activities (*'Informabus'*) facilitate the city services' making contact with informal groups of young people. There, too, a social worker from the juvenile court was assigned to the city<sup>79</sup> in order to follow the criminal offences relating to juveniles. With a youth worker, she ensures the follow-through of disadvantaged families and minors in difficulty, and, if need be, works with associations or even with psychologists to ensure the follow-through. In **Bonn**, a collaboration between the juvenile court and city services was also begun: the representatives of Justice (prosecutor of the Republic or juvenile court) in partnership with the city services can take measures so that young people take training (14–17 years of age) in automobile driving.

The work of the city of Modena does not stop there and favours the setting up of procedures for mediating disputes between groups of young people and inhabitants of the most sensitive neighbourhoods.

The mediation activities aimed at young people are found in all the cities, and this is not surprising, given the richness of the association fabric of Marseilles that is mobilised by this theme in city, where a large number of associations operate in this field<sup>80</sup>. Some of them are specialised in the question of homeless minors, this being the case particularly with *Jeunes Errants* (Young Wanderers) or, to a lesser degree, *ADELIES* (Association for the Development of Local Businesses for Economic and Social Insertion). A particularly original plan was set up by A.R.S. (Association for Social Readjustment): the Night Prevention Service.

The work of the **Night Prevention Service** (SPN) consists of listening, orientation and response to emergencies. The SPN teams always offer to take young people home to their parents in order to have an exchange with the latter. All night (from 8.30 p.m. until 4 a.m.), Monday through Saturday, SPN teams have been criss-crossing the streets of the Marseilles city centre since 1997. On weekdays and during the day, reception and ambulatory units in the city centre are manned from 4.30 to 7 p.m., in order to follow up on contacts made with young people during the night and help them become reintegrated. Two police team-members

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<sup>79</sup> The juvenile court is located in Bologna and has a regional jurisdiction.

<sup>80</sup> Nearly 92% of the direct operating budget of the Communal Prevention Council of the city of Marseilles (€410,545) is devoted to subsidies to associations.

work alternately and admit having to ‘juggle’ between their law enforcement role and the prevention work.

The SPN has woven links with a whole network of night players such as public institutions (police, social workers, et al.) and even restaurant owners and representatives of the transportation companies.

During the year 2000, the SPN met 1,600 young people in the streets at night (63% of whom were boys, 43% minors, 65% of French nationality and 40% runaways). These young people also have important psychological problems and are quite often in conflict with their parents. These night rounds have allowed for creating a precise cartography of the places where one predominantly finds certain forms of criminality such as alcoholism, drug addiction or prostitution.

In addition to the SPN, we can also mention, still concerning Marseilles, the action of **ADEJ (Access to Law for Children and Young People)**, an association of which the city is an ex-officio member and partially finances. The object and goal of this association are to favour the access of minors to the Law. It works primarily with schools in difficult areas. This access to the Law is certainly the best means for checking criminality right from the outset and in the psychological structuring of individuals and citizens’ minds.

The ADEJ also trains adult youth workers and teachers in the practice of legal access.

This association works with Éducation Nationale and is financed by the institutional partners, including the city of Marseilles, through the CCPD, the State, the county council and the region.

The youth question is also a strong main line of policies in Anglo-Saxon cities. The government launched, for local authorities, a targeting programme of the 50 young people at greatest risk (i.e., who might slip into crime as victims and/or perpetrators): the project of combating the exclusion of young people (Youth Inclusion Programme<sup>81</sup>). This technique of targeting populations is specific to the British cities Luton and Brent, which, moreover, have developed particularly evolved methodologies concerning juvenile delinquency. The two cities, along with the *Crime Concern* organisation, set up a programme entitled *Mentoring+*. This arrangement is aimed at young people at risk, aged 11 to 19. It brings together a large number of partners (up to 14 in the same neighbourhood), in particular the city schools, which allow for detecting these publics. The programme is broken down into several projects such as *Safe in the City*, aimed at preventing young people from running away from home, in particular by setting up mediations between parents and children, and the *Brent Youth Action*, in which young people are involved so as to submit the problems they live with on a daily basis. The players attribute the success of these projects to the involvement of young people in the arrangements concerning young people. Thus, young people who have had difficulties are trained in the projects and, at the end of their training, can supervise other young people, particularly by offering them remedial help. These young mentors are not paid in any way, but the project teams estimate that it is essential that their action be recognised (in particular by awarding them certificates at the end of the training they have undergone).

- ***Measures aimed at publics at risk***

While youth is the object of the greatest number of crime prevention measures of the cities studied, other populations are also the object of particular attention, primarily because they

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<sup>81</sup>Information on this programme is available at the following address: <http://www.youth-justice-board.gov.uk>

were victims or owing to their profession, which exposes them to specific risks, or else their vulnerability to certain types of crime.

First of all, this is a matter of mediation measures that concern both *victims and perpetrators of crimes*. This is particularly the case in **Marseilles**, where the *ASMAJ* association (Support Association for Mediation and Legal Units) practises legal consultations (54%) and civil and criminal mediation (9%) within the framework of affairs selected by Justice representatives. The sole condition for instituting mediation proceedings is the consent of the two parties and their involvement in the process. This mediation seeks freely negotiated solutions to a dispute opposing parties, one of which, at least, has filed a complaint following an offence committed. The mediator attempts to reconcile the opposing parties, respecting the law. That allows for making the perpetrator aware of a criminal offence and for him to take conscience of his acts by motivating him to ‘repair’ the consequences. Furthermore, the victim can express himself and participate in the compensation process. Nothing is done without the bilateral consent of the parties. The success rate is around 50%. The failures are mainly sent before the courts. In **Liège**, an *Accompanying Service for Alternative Legal Measures* (SAMJA) ensures a follow-through on adults carrying out alternative sentences, which take the form of jobs in the common interest or socio-educational training.

More specifically, oriented only towards victims, the city of **Modena** set up three services of victim aid, which offer material and psychological help, in particular for immigrants who are victims of racial discrimination. Similarly, in **Liège**, a *Police Assistance to Victims Service* (SAPV) was opened in order to provide victims with help and be directed towards other arrangements.

In **Bonn**, the police proposes training to girls and young women (20 hours for girls / 30 hours for young women) in combating sexual harassment, which allows for both making them more aware of the problem and also detecting those who might have been victims of such acts so as to direct them towards the competent services.

Finally, *the professions that are most exposed to certain forms of crime* are also the object of increasingly evolved measures that lie within the cities’ crime prevention strategies. In **Luton**, a specific division, the *Crime Reduction Unit*, developed the *Business Watch* project, which consists of a radio system linking shopkeepers, private security services and the local police. Through this means of passing on information, news concerning crime (new crime methods, suspected perpetrators, etc.) is passed on to shopkeepers. The measure was recently expanded to include discothèques and pubs. However, the city must face up to the reticence of pubs, which have to request the renewal of their licence every year and consequently do not wish to be ill viewed by the police services.

In **Liège**, the *CAP-Sécurité* programme (*Co-ordination of Preventive Actions and Safety*) is aimed at tobacconists, agents of the postal services and doctors on night duty. This programme combines both technical prevention (communication systems with the police similar to those developed in Luton’s *Business Watch* project) and awareness and training of those publics in order to reduce the risks of victimation. Thus, as concerns general practitioners, the project is the object of a convention between the City, the Group of Liège GPs, the Telesecretariat and the police. An intervention protocol, ensuring police intervention in case of a doctor’s calling, has been set up. Furthermore, doctors participate in information sessions that present the system, as well as other measures of general prevention.

Lying within a similar approach, several cities also have projects that aim at reinforcing *protection, in particular as concerns burglaries at certain levels of the population*. Whilst

the **Bonn** police, in partnership with private security services, offers training in making dwellings more secure (installation of alarms, etc.), it is surely in **Luton** that one of the most innovative projects in the area was set up. It concerns elderly people (aged between 70 and 90), who are given training and advice on fighting intruders in their home. The innovation comes from the fact that the city services provide these persons with the means for preventing relatively simple thefts ('*Granny Boots*'<sup>82</sup>).

The city visits brought out that although questions relating to **prostitutes** (male or female) are often mentioned as a priority, in particular by elected officials, cities still, with few exceptions, directly invest little in this area. For the city and the police, this theme, often touted as a political priority, is complex and mainly a matter of public order. Most of the time, it is a question of dismantling networks of exploitation and trafficking in human beings for sexual exploitation and reducing the visibility of the phenomenon. **Modena** thus set up a working party on prostitution, bringing together the prefecture and city services (in particular the Centre for Foreigners, the municipal police and victim-aid associations). However, the problem of prostitution also involves questions that come from helping victims, and, for the most part, it is the associations (such as *Icare* in Liège or *ARS* in Marseilles) that intervene.

### ***2.3.3. Anti-drug addiction policies henceforth constitute a priority in local crime prevention policies***

The fact that the fight against drug addiction has become a priority in most cities, both from the angles of health and safety, was not evident to the extent that it imposes the intervention of players whose objectives and practices can be in opposition. As admitted a street worker in the city of Bonn: '*It took the police some time to understand that we couldn't give them information! Otherwise, we'd have to change jobs! On the other hand, sometimes we ask them to give us information...*' Since then, premises bringing together police and street workers have been established in the city, but they do not have the same opening times...

This necessity of going beyond rifts between the health and safety sectors was also felt in Modena, where a conflict of principle, which had opposed educators involved in the reduction of risks for drug addicts, and policemen, convinced the city to set up a working party on the fight against drug addiction. The partnership established under the co-ordination of the director of social services now brings together a large number of players (prefecture, state and municipal police, representatives from the safety education sector, etc.) and allowed for succeeding in setting up a **drug addict aid service**. This service is in charge of the care, follow-through and reduction of risks for drug addicts. At the same time, the city developed consciousness-raising activities for young people in discotheques (*Project entitled 'Buona la Notte'*).

As a representative of the health sector of the city of Marseilles remarked, it is ***the action of elected officials that has proved decisive in going beyond these professional rifts***: '*It's the elected officials who allowed the co-existence of health policies with policies more concerned with law and order. We bring up problems together so there will be a health point of view in the safety measures*'. The fact remains that access of the most marginalised individuals to care facilities has become a priority objective for local authorities. The city of Marseilles

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<sup>82</sup> The '*Granny Boot*' is a simple length of wood that enables elderly persons to block their door when they have to open it.

henceforth has numerous plans aimed at drug addicts, in particular prevention organisers. However, the local players acknowledge that, although the reduction of drug-related problems is possible in public areas, it remains much more difficult to carry out in 'closed' areas such as schools.

The Anglo-Saxon cities distinguish themselves by linking the issue of drug addiction to that of alcoholism. In Luton, an important project carried out in partnership between the city and police services (*Community against Drugs*) aims at promoting prevention and informative actions regarding drugs and alcohol. This project is especially intended for ethnic minorities (in particular those of Pakistan and Bangladesh), which are the most affected and, according to the city services, still have trouble admitting the existence of drug addicts in their midst. The work of the project's teams consists of detecting members of the hardest-hit communities and starting individual training with them. Here, the ***strategy is clearly of the bottom-up type***: referral groups inform the city teams about the evolution of the situation in the neighbourhoods.

Another interesting plan, the ***Observatory for Prevention and Dialogue on Drugs***, set up in Liège, aims, like the Luton programme, at detecting the phenomena more rapidly, interpreting them and passing them along as quickly as possible to the services concerned. The Liège programme combating drug addiction now includes the following organisations:

- An emergency reception department at the hospital, specifically devoted to taking in drug addicts, and which ensures that the partner organisations take responsibility for these persons;
- A reception service for drug addicts, named SORT, which is also involved in consciousness-raising for the police forces;
- A centre entitled START-MASS, open 24 hours a day, for drug addicts;
- And a *Pharmacist-Advice Cell*, which enables the most marginalised addicts to rapidly get substitution treatments.

## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The objective of the *Secucities* Crime Prevention Europe project was to compare the prevention policies instituted in seven European cities in order to bring out a common body. This objective constituted a real challenge for all the participants: how to compare what is done in one city with policies conducted in other European cities, which one imagines to be different in many regards? The work seminars, on-site visits and the research carried out rapidly brought to the fore common problems and solutions that were often similar. There remains the fact that it will be necessary in the future to return to the same places to compare their respective evolutions...

Here we present the conclusions and recommendations that the comparison of policies studied allows us to bring out, both at the level of the implementation of a local crime prevention strategy as well as the role of the States of the European Union.

### Local crime prevention plans

#### □ **Diagnosis**

Most of the cities set up tools for having a better idea of the crime situation they had to face and to better evaluate the social demand. However, these tools occasionally err through a lack of data supplementing police statistics and/or the absence of periodicity allowing for the study of evolutions.

### *Recommendations*

- The realisation of a *shared diagnosis* is a condition *sine qua non* for the setting up and follow-through of actions.
- In addition to an analysis of crime and the feeling of insecurity of the populations, this diagnosis will gather the largest amount of data available from the partners, who will be associated in setting up the project. A victimation inquiry can supplement the analysis in order to inform about less commonly studied violence such as intrafamilial violence.
- The participation methods of the inhabitants, in particular during meetings, remains underestimated for really taking what they have to say into account in these policies and should be improved.
- This diagnosis should be repeated periodically; a periodicity of two years seems necessary.

#### □ **Partnership at the local level**

Partnership is the most noteworthy common trait of the experiments studied. As we have seen, it can be provoked, as when the national institutions commit the cities to setting up, or voluntary, as when the cities set it up on their own initiative. The number of partners involved in the realisation of prevention policies is always considerable but clearly limits itself in the phases of conception and carrying out of actions.

### ***Recommendations***

- Partnership should be expanded to a large number of players—public, private as well as volunteer (the associations).
- It should constitute a real involvement of the organisations represented in working together. In addition, the modes of co-operation between the players can be specified (notion of subsidised partnership).
- The notion of territorialisation is essential, as sectors of the same city may necessitate specific action plans and partnerships.
- A management structure placed under the responsibility of the mayor or the elected official in charge of the issues of crime prevention should meet regularly (monthly) for setting priorities.
- An *ad hoc* structure made up of partners in actions will ensure the effectiveness of measures implemented. Representation of elected officials is indispensable.

#### **□ The action plan**

Whilst all the cities set up relatively coherent crime prevention strategies, they do not all make the effort to formalise them in a document to which the city services (or, to a lesser degree, the citizens) can refer.

### ***Recommendations***

- The action plan should be broken down into specific topics.
- The means implemented and the set objectives will be made clear.
- Short-, medium- and long-term objectives should be set
- Like the diagnosis, the overall strategy implemented should be reviewed periodically.

#### **□ The evaluation of actions**

According to the admission of local players, the overall evaluation of plans is, with a few rare exceptions, the weak point of the policies studied.

### ***Recommendations***

- Evaluation pursues two objectives: enabling players of the prevention policies to ascertain the results of the actions undertaken and to inform the citizens about the policies implemented.
- Evaluation concerns both:  
The implementation processes of the actions (what organisational changes? / What involvement of partners? What connection with other initiatives? etc.)
- Resources mobilised (human, financial, etc.)
- The impact of the actions (Did the actions have the desired result? / What are the unexpected results? etc.)
- Evaluation must be periodical: yearly recurrence may seem excessive and is most often linked in the projects studied to the allocation of resources by the national authorities. A temporality of two years seems appropriate.
- Collaborations with universities are suggested for carrying out evaluations.



## The role of the States and the European Union

### □ The role of the States

The influence of national policies is a key variable in the establishment of a local crime prevention strategy; it is, in particular, a structuring element of the local Anglo-Saxon, Belgian and, to a lesser degree, French policies. In the image of Belgium and the United Kingdom, the State can be an important financial partner and thereby permit cities in difficulty to develop policies of importance. However, tools intended for local players (guides, exchanges of practices, methodological support) remain much more developed in the United Kingdom.

### Recommendations

- It is indispensable that States recognise the city as the pertinent level for setting up a crime prevention policy.
- The balance between the crime prevention plans and law enforcement should be achieved.
- The support in terms of methodology and financing for setting up local crime prevention policies should be ensured in part at the national level.
- Exchanges of practices between the local players should be furthered (guides of practices, the organisation of meetings, support for networks of local players, etc.).

### □ The role of the European Union

The crime prevention policy of the European Union was recently marked both by the *Hippocrates* budgetary financing line and the setting up of the *European Crime Prevention Network*. It constitutes a pertinent synthesis of the actions undertaken in the States. Meetings such as the Naples Conference (December 2000) have shown that many players of crime prevention policies are henceforth ready to federate around the European idea.

### Recommendations

- The European Union should continue to support exchanges between the local players in crime prevention policies.
- Training underwritten by the European institutions, intended for local players in crime prevention and carried out by universities or city networks, would constitute a major advance in advancing the European idea.

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